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Abstract 
Booking photographs, also known as “mug shots,” have served law enforcement 
purposes for centuries. Mug shots also dominate media coverage of crime. These images 
attract readers, as tabloid publications and reputable newspapers alike maintain online 
databases of mug shots. Observing this popularity, Internet entrepreneurs saw an 
opportunity to make a profit. Mug shot website proprietors began to “scrape” mug shots 
from local law enforcement agencies and post the images along with the arrested 
individual’s name and reason for arrest online. To make a profit, sites began to charge 
fees to remove individuals’ mug shots from their websites. This practice sparked several 
reactions. Search engines like Google changed their algorithms to push mug shot 
websites further back in results pages. Payment service providers began to refuse to do 
business with the mug shot websites. State legislatures began passing laws to make this 
business practice illegal, often restricting or placing conditions on access to once-public 
mug shots in the process. Individuals began to sue these websites, arguing the sites’ use 
of their mug shots was for a commercial purpose that violated the individuals’ right of 
publicity. In response, mug shot websites have largely adapted their business practices, 
now only collecting revenue from displaying mug shots alongside advertising or 
collecting subscription fees. 
The reactions to mug shot websites’ new business practices raise concerns for all 
content creators. Restricted access to mug shots through a patchwork of state laws about 
their use and right of publicity lawsuits based on mug shot websites provide a lens 
through which to view the conflict between individuals’ interest in controlling 
information about themselves and content creators’ interest in autonomously deciding 
what to publish pursuant to the First Amendment. This thesis begins by discussing the 
history of mug shots, the rise of mug shot websites, and the reactions to these websites. 
The thesis then traces the legal roots of two of these responses: the legislative approaches 
to mug shots and the development of the right of publicity. Next, this thesis considers a 
theoretical framework through which to view both sides of this debate—an individual’s 
autonomy interest in controlling information and a publisher’s interest in making 
autonomous publishing decisions. Then, this thesis considers how courts have resolved 
the conflict between these positions.  
Finally, this thesis concludes that going forward, a unified approach, rather than a 
patchwork of state laws addressing harms that arise from uses of information or a tort 
claim without an underlying theory, should govern conflicts between individuals and 
publishers. A unified approach that values the autonomy of both parties best balances the 
two positions. Courts should consider the totality of the circumstances in which the use of 
information about an individual appears to determine whether the First Amendment 
interest outweighs the individual’s autonomy interest. Only then will a manageable 
approach to the use of an individuals’ information emerge—one that protects both First 
Amendment interests and provides meaningful protection to individuals from future 
harms stemming from new uses of technology.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Meagan Simmons, a 28-year-old Florida mother of four, probably never expected 
to become an Internet meme. Nor did she expect to be featured in an advertisement for a 
background check website. But her booking photograph, commonly known as a “mug 
shot,” snapped at the Hillsborough, Florida jail in the wee hours of July 25, 2010, set all 
of these events into motion.
1
 Simmons was arrested for driving under the influence on 
July 25, 2010.
2
 As part of the standard arrest process, a deputy at the Hillsborough, 
Florida, jail took her photograph.
3
 This public record then made its way to a website that 
compiles mug shots.
4
 But Simmons’ mug shot was not like all the others; she is 
undeniably attractive. Thus, her mug shot caught the attention of users of websites The 
Chive and Reddit in late 2012 and early 2013.
5
 She became known as the “hot convict” in 
some Internet circles.
6
 Users began to create Internet memes using Simmons’ mug shot,7 
with such commentary as “Miss Demeanor,” “Guilty of taking my breath away,” “This is 
what a model inmate looks like,” “Appears on Cops, Gets modeling contract,” and “I 
                                                 
1
 Jon Silman, Woman behind ‘attractive convict’ mug shot sued for invasion of privacy, TAMPA BAY TIMES 
(Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/civil/zephyrhills-woman-in-attractive-convict-
mugshot-files-suit/2167688. 
 
2
 Id. 
 
3
 Id.. 
 
4
 Id. 
 
5
 Id. 
 
6
 Id. 
 
7
 Id. A meme is an “idea . . . or usage that spreads from person to person within a culture,” and in the 
context of the Internet, memes are recognized as images that individuals superimpose with their own ideas, 
statements or jokes. Meme, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (last visited April 1, 2014), 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meme. 
 
   2 
guess it’s true, looks do kill.”8 But it was only after a background check website, 
InstantCheckmate.com, used her mug shot in an advertisement for its services that 
Simmons filed suit.
9
 The ad featured her mug shot with a caption reading, “Sometimes 
the cute ones aren’t that innocent.”10 Discussing the basis for Simmons’ suit, her attorney, 
Matthew Christ, said, “At the end of the day, this is actually about intellectual property. If 
someone is going to use your image, they need to pay you for it.”11 He distinguished it 
from previous Internet meme uses of Simmons’ image because of 
InstantCheckmates.com’s commercial purpose for using the image.12 “The legal issue is 
it’s your face, and your name. You own it. You can use it, you control it and when 
someone misappropriates it — that’s when you’re violating Florida law.”13 Simmons’ 
lawsuit seeks an injunction to prohibit further use of her mug shot by the website and 
monetary damages for mental anguish.
14
 
Simmons’ mug shot’s trajectory speaks to the progression of the use of mug shots 
over time. First used only for law enforcement purposes, mug shots have increasingly 
become a ubiquitous aspect of American culture, particularly in the context of media 
                                                 
8
 Meagan Simmons Sues Websites Over ‘Attractive Convict’ Mug Shot, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 28, 
2014 6:59 PM EST), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/28/meagan-simmons-attractive-convict-
sues_n_4875035.html. 
 
9
 Silman, supra note 1. 
 
10
 Id. 
 
11
 Id. 
 
12
 Id. 
 
13
 Id. 
 
14
 Brett Snider, ‘Hot Convict’ Sues Website Over Mugshot Ad, INJURED: THE FINDLAW ACCIDENT, INJURY 
AND TORT LAW BLOG (Feb. 28, 2014, 10:50 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/injured/2014/02/hot-convict-
sues-website-over-mugshot-ad.html. 
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coverage of crime. Beginning in 2010, however, several individuals developed a business 
model utilizing mug shots, which are public records in many jurisdictions. These mug 
shot websites collected mug shots, posted them online, and then made money by charging 
those pictured on the websites to take down their mug shots. Not long after these 
practices were unveiled by several media outlets did the public and press react negatively, 
likening this business model to extortion. In the face of private business and public 
pressures, these websites’ business models have generally shifted. Like online 
newspapers, mug shot websites’ revenue-generating methods now focus on advertising. 
This makes distinguishing them from newspapers more difficult. Reactions to these 
websites potentially raise First Amendment concerns and implicate the rights of content 
creators to use mug shots. 
This thesis proceeds with the history of mug shots and their use by law 
enforcement and media. Following that, a discussion of the rise of today’s mug shot 
industry, including several permutations of business models, outlines how mug shot 
websites operate. This section also addresses reactions to this industry, including 
legislative action, and explains mug shots’ status as public records. One of the crucial 
responses to mug shot websites covered in this section is a lawsuit claiming a violation of 
the right of publicity. The next part discusses the history of torts tied to the unauthorized 
use of one’s identity, covering in depth the foundation of these torts in privacy law. Next, 
a discussion of autonomy theory explains how torts tied to use of identity and First 
Amendment interests in publishing information both implicate theory grounded in 
autonomy. This section also explores the conflicts between these theories and discusses 
factors courts consider when weighing an individual’s claim for control of information 
   4 
about him or herself against First Amendment rights of content creators. Keeping this 
history and development in mind, this thesis next turns to several questions: what are the 
theoretical underpinnings for the resolution of conflicts between the right to control 
information and the right to publish? How should courts balance these rights in the digital 
information age?  
This thesis proposes that a unified theory based in autonomy best undergirds 
claims based on identity while still maintaining First Amendment rights of those who 
create content. This thesis concludes that an autonomy-based approach accounts for the 
First Amendment, economic, and privacy interests at stake in identity-based claims. This 
approach requires a conscientious effort by courts to analyze the context in which mug 
shots appear, drawing on the “totality of the circumstances” approach courts follow in 
defamation cases. This approach would ensure coverage of crime continues while 
respecting the autonomy and privacy interests of those depicted in mug shots. 
II. THE HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND USE OF MUG SHOTS 
 
A. The History of Mug shots 
 
Law enforcement officials realized that modern photography, developed in the 
1820s and 1830s, could be useful for police purposes later that century.
15
 The San 
Francisco Police Department began to keep records with suspects’ images and 
biographical details in 1854, and the New York Police Department followed along under 
the leadership of Chief Detective Thomas F. Byrnes in 1858.
16
 Byrnes created a book of 
                                                 
15
 THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, VOL. 5, 1143 
(Wilbur R. Miller, ed. 2012). 
 
16
 JONATHAN FINN, CAPTURING THE CRIMINAL IMAGE: FROM MUG SHOT TO SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY, 6 
(2009). 
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204 photographs of criminals he called the “Rogue’s Gallery” that the police showed to 
eyewitnesses to identify suspects.
17
 This book proved unwieldy and inefficient, though, 
forcing eyewitnesses to look over too many images to identify one suspect. French police 
officer Alphonse Bertillon identified this problem and developed a more systematic way 
to identify suspects after he began to work for the Parisian police department in 1879.
18
  
Bertillon organized the images by combining photographs of the individuals’ front and 
profile, similar to today’s mug shots, with “detailed anthropometric measurements, 
records of tattoos and scars, and notes of personality characteristics.”19 Police recorded 
this information on cards that they filed and indexed for easier access.
20
 
Public awareness of crime has increased since those early years. As the mass 
media developed, law enforcement increasingly turned to outside sources for aid in the 
search for suspects, and popular interest in crime has led to increased coverage of 
crime.
21
 The spread of printing technology in the 1800s led to greater awareness about 
crime among the public, as more citizens became literate and read papers that included 
crime stories.
22
 Crime reporting became increasingly sensational during the twentieth 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
17
 THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, vol. 5, supra note 15 
at 1143; FINN, supra note 16, at 7. 
 
18
 FINN, supra note 16, at 23. 
 
19
 THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, vol. 5, supra note 15 
at 1143. 
 
20
 Id. 
 
21
 THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, vol. 1, 1243 (Wilbur 
R. Miller, ed. 2012). 
 
22
 THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at 
1243.  
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century, with images of “fatal bar brawls and car chases through brothel raids to mobster 
warfare” dominating newspaper coverage.23  
Police began to turn to the news media to gather information about suspects in the 
twentieth century.
24
 The police began the practice of, in seeking information about a 
crime suspect, providing the media with images of a suspect, which the news 
“circulates…. in the hope that someone will know the suspect and report him or her to the 
police.”25 Television shows entirely dedicated to showing images of wanted suspects to 
get tips and leads on suspects from the public started in Germany in 1967 and spread to 
the United States in the 1980s with the program America’s Most Wanted.26 Today, 
“[m]ug shots permeate our daily lives in newspapers, on television, and in film.”27  
Traditional newspapers regularly include mug shots in crime coverage.
28
 Mug 
shots often run alongside stories about crime to show the suspect. Beyond use in their 
coverage of crime, even traditional, “mainstream” newspapers post mug shots in online 
galleries.
29
 The Chicago Tribune and The Washington Post both include galleries of mug 
shots. The Washington Post’s mug shot gallery, for example, is surrounded by banner 
                                                 
23
 Id. at 1244.  
 
24
 Id. at 1245.  
 
25
 Id. at 1243. 
 
26
 THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, vol. 5, supra note 15 
at 1143. 
 
27
 FINN, supra note 16, at 23. 
 
28
 Allen Rostron, The Mugshot Industry: Freedom of Speech, Rights of Publicity, and the Controversy 
Sparked by an Unusual New Type of Business, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1321, 1323 (2013). 
 
29
 Id.. 
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advertising and includes a video advertisement before a reader can view the gallery.
30
 
The captions below the mug shots describe the individual’s crime and include a link to 
the Post’s coverage of the crime.31 The Chicago Tribune’s gallery, “Mugs in the news,” 
is also surrounded by advertising.
32
 The top of the gallery includes a disclaimer that 
reads, “Arrest and booking photos are provided by law enforcement officials. Arrest does 
not imply guilt, and criminal charges are merely accusations. A defendant is presumed 
innocent unless proven guilty and convicted.”33 The gallery includes the defendant’s 
name, the law enforcement agency from where the image came, and the charge.
34
 
Tabloids like the National Enquirer have never shied away from publishing mug 
shots—particularly those in which a celebrity looks unusual or somehow shocking.35 
TMZ.com, a tabloid and gossip website, maintains an online gallery of celebrity mug 
shots, including advertisements after every fourth mug shot.
36
 Print tabloids entirely 
dedicated to mug shots have been popping up around the country in recent years.
37
 These 
mug shot tabloids, with titles like Cellmates, Jailbirds, Just Busted, Jail House Rocs and 
                                                 
30
 D.C. region mug shots, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/2014/03/01/9869432e-c08e-11e1-95b8-
18a2903941ea_gallery.html#item0. 
 
31
 Id. 
 
32
 Mugs in the news, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 14, 2014), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-mug-photogallery,0,5488047.photogallery. 
 
33
 Id. 
 
34
 Id. 
 
35
 Rostron, supra note 28, at 1323. 
 
36
 Celebrity Mug Shots, TMZ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.tmz.com/photos/2007/05/09/39-
celebrity-mug-shots/images/2014/01/23/012314-justin-bieber-mugshot-dui-troubled-jpg. 
 
37
 Debbie Elliot, The Newest Magazine Fad: The Mug Shot Tabloid, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Nov. 23, 
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/23/142701001/the-newest-magazine-fad-the-mug-shot-tabloid. 
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The Slammer, have become increasingly ubiquitous in the southern United States.
38
 The 
publisher of one Arkansas-based tabloid, Daniel Schroeder, told NPR he considers the 
tabloids “[m]odern-day stockades.”39 On sale at gas stations and convenience stores, the 
papers include rows of mug shots, often divided into categories based on age, hairstyle, 
attractiveness, and other notable features of those pictured.
40
 Sprinkled throughout the 
mug shots are short crime stories and advertisements.
41
 Schroeder’s The Slammer sold 
7,000 copies a week at the time of NPR’s 2011 report.42 Caught Up, a weekly based in 
Tennessee, does even better—distributing more than 25,000 copies each week.43 The 
paper, however, is now defunct, and Schroeder has moved on to a new mug shot 
tabloid.
44
 Schroeder explained the medium’s popularity by saying, “Most people look at 
this because they’re curious and they want to gawk and gossip a little bit . . . But there’s a 
good side to it to that provides people with an opportunity to see maybe somebody that 
they know has committed a crime, or somebody — might be a victim of a crime — is 
able to see the person that committed the crime if they haven’t been caught already.”45 
Schroeder has also said, “It is legal to publish this, you may not like it, but if (an arrest 
                                                 
38
 Id. 
 
39
 Id. 
 
40
 Id. 
 
41
 Id. 
 
42
 Id. 
 
43
 Emma Lacey-Bordeux and Gavin Godfrey, Published mug shots: A constant reminder of one man’s past, 
CNN (May 29, 2012, 12:10 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/29/us/mug-shot-
websites/index.html?hpt=ju_t3. 
 
44
 Suspect’s Mugshots Have Long Life In Internet, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 15, 2013), 
http://www.monroenews.com/news/2013/dec/15/suspects-mugshots-have-long-life-internet/. 
 
45
 Elliot, supra note 37. 
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happens), it’s going to (be published) . . . I’m proud of what we did. It’s not the most 
highbrow of journalism. But we tried to show and handle the subject manner with some 
respect and dignity.”46 
B. The Rise of Commercial Mug Shot Websites 
 
Public attention first turned to the publication of mug shots by websites that profit 
from posting the images online in 2011.
47
 At that time, websites like florida.arrests.org 
and BustedMugshots.com had recently begun to scour databases of booking photos from 
local law enforcement offices using scraping software, collect the images and 
biographical information, and post them all in one place.
48
 For the individuals pictured in 
these photographs, what was once buried by the protection of police CGI search scripts 
suddenly appeared in search engine results.
49
  
Controversy has surrounded mug shot websites for several years, and their 
business models have seemingly shifted with public sentiment. Today, the websites 
themselves generally explain their purpose and viewpoint in “About Us” sections. 
Bustedmugshots.com, for example, includes an “About Us” page, which states that its 
purpose is to “synergize multiple sources of law enforcement data in one convenient 
                                                 
46
 Suspect’s Mugshots Have Long Life in Internet, supra note 44. 
 
47
 See David Kravets, Mug-Shot Industry Will Dig Up Your Past, Charge You to Bury It Again, WIRED 
(Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/08/mugshots; Joshua Benton, Some digging by The 
New York Times strikes a blow against those skeezy mugshot sites, NIEMAN JOURNALISM LAB, HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY (Oct. 7, 2013, 11:28 AM), http://www.niemanlab.org/2013/10/some-digging-by-the-new-
york-times-strikes-a-blow-against-those-skeezy-mugshot-sites (both tracing the advent of commercial mug 
shot websites to 2011). 
 
48
 Kravets, supra note 47.  
 
49
 Id. 
   10 
location for the education of the public.”50 The site explains that it seeks to offer recent, 
accurate information, but clarifies that: 
[I]n some cases, we realize for the greater good of providing this information, we 
receive requests to be removed from our database. We are especially sensitive to 
cases where records should have been sealed or expunged. Given the very nature 
of expunction (no official order is made public) it is difficult for us to proactively 
remove records that have already been released to us by sheriff and police 
agencies; however, we make every effort to remove that information when it is 
brought to our attention. On the other hand, we do not allow the removal of 
serious violent or sex crime arrests that have not been exonerated or found not 
guilty.
51
 
 
The site also seems to address its controversial nature, suggesting a change in 
attitude about mug shots: 
As we continue to bring you publicly available crime incident, sex offender 
registry and arrest information, we hope to begin changing attitudes about crime 
information and personal safety. It’s our mission at Busted! to help make crime 
awareness part of your everyday life in keeping yourself and family safe – just the 
same as locking your doors, setting your alarms, protecting your identity, hugging 
your kids, etc. Crimes are occurring around you and your loved ones every second 
of every day. What are you doing to stay aware, informed, and safe?
52
 
 
Finally, fine print at the bottom of the site addresses the nature of the information 
it provides, clarifying the role of mug shots in the criminal justice system: 
Disclaimer: BustedMugshots.com reproduces publicly available arrest and 
booking records obtained from the relevant city, county or state reporting agency. 
BustedMugshots.com makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all information 
on the site, but does not guarantee accuracy of the records. The data may not 
reflect the status of current charges or convictions and all individuals are 
presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. Users shall not use the 
data to determine any individual's criminal or conviction record. Please contact 
                                                 
50
 About Us, BUSTEDMUGSHOTS.COM (lasted visited Mar. 14, 2014), 
http://www.bustedmugshots.com/about. 
 
51
 Id. 
 
52
 Id. 
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BustedMugshots.com to report an inaccuracy or call us at 800-849-BUSTED 
(800-849-2878).
53
 
 
Mug shot websites generally operate under one of three business models: an 
arrangement with “reputation management” companies for paid removal of mug shots, 
direct payments to the website for removal by those pictured in mug shots, or profits from 
advertising or subscriptions. When Wired magazine first investigated mug shot websites 
several years ago, many websites sustained their operations through relationships with 
“reputation-management companies.”54 These sites still exist today. Individuals who 
want their photos erased could pay companies like RemoveSlander.com fees to get the 
images removed from the mug shot websites.
55
 RemoveSlander.com, for example, 
advertises on its site: “Hire RemoveSlander.com And Get Your Mug Shot Deleted from 
Google ASAP!!!”56  
The proprietors of reputation management companies told Wired magazine that 
removing the mug shots from the sites and from search engines’ search indexes was “a 
trade secret” and required a “tremendous amount of work.”57 Doing some investigation of 
its own, Wired discovered that in fact, the mug shot websites and reputation management 
companies were in collusion.
58
 The mug shot websites allegedly provided the reputation 
management companies with the URL for an automated takedown script for the mug shot 
                                                 
53
 Id. 
 
54
 Kravets, supra note 47. 
 
55
 Id. 
 
56
 I Need Help Removing Negative Pictures, REMOVESLANDER.COM (last updated Oct. 22, 2013), 
http://www.removeslander.com/Florida-Arrest-Mug-Shot-Search.html. 
 
57
 Kravets, supra note 47. 
 
58
 Id. 
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website—for a fee of about ten dollars.59 Another script, worth another fee, removed the 
content from search engines’ indexes.60 Rob Wiggens, creator of florida.arrests.org, 
confirmed the existence of these takedown tools, but the representatives of reputation 
management firms refused to discuss their methods.
61
 RemoveSlander.com’s disclaimer 
states, “We are not affiliated with any mugshot websites - and can only offer a service to 
bury mugshot links on to lower pages in Google.”62 Its spokesperson, Philip Lee, said the 
site should not be associated with mug shot sites.
63
 It seems possible, however, that this 
symbiotic relationship lined the pockets of both reputation management firms and the 
mug shot websites themselves.
64
 
The mug shot industry attracted the attention of The New York Times by late 
2013, resulting in coverage that some argue may have caused a shift within the industry.
65
 
David Segal reported that by October 2013, 80 websites made money by demanding 
payment for removal directly from the individuals pictured.
66
 Many of the proprietors 
professed to offer free removal of mug shots to those whose charges were dropped or 
                                                 
59
 Id. 
 
60
 Id. 
 
61
 Id. 
 
62
 Disclaimer, RemoveSlander.com (last updated Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.removeslander.com/Florida-
Arrest-Mug-Shot-Search.html. 
 
63
 Lacey-Bordeux and Godfrey, supra note 43. 
 
64
 Kravets, supra note 47. 
 
65
 Kashmir Hill, Payment Providers And Google Will Kill The Mug-Shot Extortion Industry Faster Than 
Lawmakers Can, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/10/07/payment-
providers-and-google-will-kill-the-mug-shot-extortion-industry-faster-than-lawmakers (stating that Times’ 
reporter David Segal’s “investigation may be the fix” for the mug shot industry). 
 
66
 David Segal, Mugged by a Mug Shot Online, THE N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/mugged-by-a-mug-shot-online.html?pagewanted=all. 
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who were found not guilty.
67
 Free removal from one site, however, is of little comfort 
when a multitude of other sites copy the image from the original website and repost the 
mug shot. For instance, Princess Matthews of Toledo, Ohio, got her mug shot from a 
dropped charge successfully removed from one site for free, but the mug shot continued 
to appear on other websites.
68
 Removal was not free across the board for Matthews, with 
some sites asking more than $300 per image.
69
 Other have has similar experiences. 
Donald Andrew McMahon was actually convicted of his crimes and served time in jail, 
but was able to pay to have his mug shot removed.
70
 Shortly thereafter, it appeared on 
four other websites.
71
  
The payment services used to process removal fees attracted some attention 
during the course of Segal’s investigation. After learning about the websites, 
MasterCard’s general counsel said he found their practices “repugnant” and that he had 
asked the merchant bank that handled MasterCard’s mug shot site accounts to terminate 
the sites as customers.
72
 PayPal also decided to “‘discontinue support for mug-shot 
removal payments.’”73 American Express and Discover responded in kind, and Visa 
reported it was investigating the legality of the sites’ business practices.74 
                                                 
67
 Id. 
 
68
 Id. 
 
69
 Id. 
 
70
 Lacey-Bordeux and Godfrey, supra note 43. 
 
71
 Id. 
 
72
 Segal, supra note 66. 
 
73
 Id. 
 
74
 Id. 
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Beyond changes by payment systems, search engine results for mug shot websites 
may have also seen a hit in the wake of Segal’s reporting. When he originally 
investigated the industry in late 2013, mug shot websites appeared at the top of results 
lists when a user ran a Google search query for a person’s name whose mug shot 
appeared on a website.
75
 The Google search algorithm’s “results are supposed to reflect 
both relevance and popularity,” and the mug shots’ appearances at the top suggested the 
sites were attracting plenty of attention.
76
 Indeed, Matt Waite, a journalism professor who 
created one of the earliest online mug shot galleries for The Tampa Bay Times, said that 
“pageviews remain the coin of the realm, and these mug shot websites are pageview 
machines at almost no cost.”77 By changing its search algorithm to knock mug shot 
websites down further on results lists, “Google could do what no legislator could — 
demote mug-shot sites and thus reduce, if not eliminate, their power to stigmatize.”78 
Google spokesman Jason Freidenfelds originally responded to Segal’s inquiries about 
mug shot websites with “a statement that amounted to an empathetic shrug.”79 But 
Freidenfelds got back to Segal with an update: “Our team has been working for the past 
few months on an improvement to our algorithms to address this overall issue in a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
75
 Id. 
 
76
 Id. 
 
77
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consistent way. We hope to have it out in the coming weeks.”80 After Google adjusted its 
algorithm in the midst of Segal’s reporting in fall 2013, the owner of JustMugshots.com, 
one of the mug shot sites, reported that searches that used to show his site on the first 
page of results now showed his site on the fifth page of results.
81
 Whether the change to 
the algorithm has resulted in meaningful change is debatable.
82
 A Google search for 
Maxwell Birnbaum, the original subject of the Times report, still returned a result from 
Mugshots.com as the first result on March 20, 2014. 
Many mug shot websites have now turned to more traditional business methods 
such as running advertisements alongside mug shots
83
 or subscription services.
84
 
BustedMugshots.com’s subscription service offers unlimited access to its mug shot 
repository for $19.95 a month.
85
 Subscribers can search the mug shot database by name, 
set up alerts for particular names, and monitor arrests in their neighborhood.
86
 
JustMugshots.com relies on advertising on its site for revenue, clarifying that it does “not 
accept payment for removals, updates, or any other services.”87 Rather, 
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JustMugshots.com features advertising banners beside mug shots online.
88
 These 
advertising and subscription services are more similar to traditional news websites that 
include mug shots in reporting alongside purchased advertising, sometimes behind a 
paywall. 
C. The Status of Mug Shots as Public or Private Records 
 Whether a booking photograph constitutes a public record is a matter determined 
by the jurisdiction. States vary widely as to whether they consider mug shots public or 
private records.
89
 At the federal level, the circuits are split as to whether mug shots are 
public records pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in Detroit Free Press v. Department of Justice that 
disclosure of mug shots does not implicate defendants’ privacy rights.90 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh and Tenth Circuits, however, treats mug shots as 
private records.
91
  
The Freedom of Information Act, passed in 1966, creates a presumption of 
openness for records held by federal executive branch agencies.
92
 Crucial to this 
openness is citizens’ abilities to “draw their own conclusions” about government policies 
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via the access they receive through FOIA.
93
 In passing FOIA, Congress recognized the 
importance of weighing citizens’ needs “to have access to government information in 
order to participate in self-rule” against “the government’s need to keep some 
information confidential and the individual’s need for privacy.”94 FOIA permits citizens 
to request records from federal agencies.
95
 Thus, to balance the presumption that records 
are public, Congress included Exemption 7(C).
96
 Privacy concerns have increased in 
recent years “as computerized federal agency databases have accumulated tremendous 
amounts of personally-identifiable information such as names, addresses, and social 
security numbers.”97 Policy discussions surrounding FOIA focus on the use of the 
information by the requestors and the potential consequences for those who argue their 
privacy is invaded by the release of records.
98
 Derivative uses—uses of public records for 
purposes other than why the records were originally compiled—made by FOIA 
requestors have also drawn criticism from privacy advocates.
99
 A request by a journalist 
to collect records for an investigative story, for example, constitutes a derivative use.
100
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The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits considered the question of whether disclosing 
mug shots violates Exemption 7(C) of the federal Freedom of Information Act.
101
 
Exemption 7(C) exempts from public disclosure “records or information compiled for 
law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law 
enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”102 This language was amended in 1986—
prior to that year, it read “would constitute,” rather than “could reasonably be expected to 
constitute.”103 The Supreme Court interpreted this amendment to mean that Congress 
wanted to give agencies more flexibility to deny FOIA requests based on privacy 
concerns.
104
 The Court held that an agency need not disclose a record if “(1) the 
information sought implicates someone’s personal privacy, (2) no legitimate public 
interest outweighs infringing the individual’s personal privacy interest, and (3) disclosing 
the information ‘could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy.’”105  
The Sixth Circuit considered privacy rights in the mug shots of eight defendants 
who were indicted and awaiting trial in federal court in Detroit Free Press v. Dep’t of 
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Justice.
106
 To apply the privacy exemption under FOIA, the court wrote that it must 
balance “the need for protection of private information against the benefit to be obtained 
by disclosure of information concerning the workings of components of our federal 
government.”107 The court noted that, in this balancing, the “ridicule or embarrassment 
from the disclosure of information in the possession of government agencies” does not 
establish a privacy invasion.
108
 The court focused on the public nature of the proceedings 
against those indicted and that their names and images were already associated with the 
indictment.
109
 Balancing any privacy claimed by those indicted against the public 
interest, the court wrote that “[e]ven had an encroachment upon personal privacy been 
found, however, a significant public interest in the disclosure of the mug shots of the 
individuals awaiting trial could, nevertheless, justify the release of that information to the 
public.”110 The court found that in a given case, a court could find that “[p]ublic 
disclosure of mug shots in limited circumstances can, however, serve to subject the 
government to public oversight.”111 On these grounds, the Sixth Circuit concluded that 
disclosing mug shots in an instance involving “ongoing criminal proceedings in which 
the names of the indicted suspects have already been made public and in which the 
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defendants have already appeared publicly in court” does not implicate defendants’ 
privacy rights and so does not fall within Exemption 7(C).
112
  
The Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, in which a freelance journalist, Theodore Karantsalis, sought the mug shot of a 
man convicted of securities fraud.
113
 Karantsalis requested the mug shot from the United 
States Marshals Service, who denied the request, citing Exemption 7(C), and argued that 
disclosure of the mug shot would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the convict’s 
personal privacy.
114
 The Marshals Service maintains a policy that it does not release 
booking photographs unless the release serves a law enforcement goal of “address[ing] an 
issue involving a fugitive.”115 This Marshals Service policy, the court noted, differs for 
FOIA requests from the Sixth Circuit due to the holding in Detroit Free Press, and the 
court applied the Marshals Service’s policy within the Eleventh Circuit.116 Deciding that 
the mug shot implicated the convict’s privacy interests, the court wrote: 
[A] booking photograph is a unique and powerful type of photograph that raises 
personal privacy interests distinct from normal photographs. A booking 
photograph is a vivid symbol of criminal accusation, which, when released to the 
public, intimates, and is often equated with, guilt. Further, a booking photograph 
captures the subject in the vulnerable and embarrassing moments immediately 
after being accused, taken into custody, and deprived of most liberties. Finally . . .  
booking photographs taken by the Marshals Service are generally not available 
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for public dissemination; an attribute which suggests the information implicates a 
personal privacy interest.
117
 
The court next concluded that there was little public interest in the mug shot; 
Karantsalis asserted that the convict’s countenance in the photograph might reveal 
whether he was receiving preferential treatment.
118
 The court was unconvinced of the 
value of the mug shot in determining a prisoner’s treatment, and it said general curiosity 
about a prisoner’s facial expression is not an interest that serves FOIA’s public oversight 
goals.
119
 Finally, the court concluded that “the balance weighs heavily against disclosure” 
because of the convict’s “substantial personal privacy interest in preventing public 
dissemination of his non-public booking photographs,” contrasted with the public’s lack 
of a “discernable interest from viewing the booking photographs, except perhaps the 
negligible value of satisfying voyeuristic curiosities.”120 The Tenth Circuit joined the 
Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in 2012 in World Pub. Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice.121  
The circuit split, combined with the federal government’s preferred policy to not 
release mug shots, has led to an unusual situation for requests for mug shots nationwide. 
The Marshals Service will release mug shots to FOIA requesters in the Sixth Circuit and 
will subsequently release any photos requested in the Sixth Circuit to anyone else who 
                                                 
117
 Id. at 503. 
 
118
 Id. at 504. 
119
 Id. 
 
120
 Id. 
 
121
 672 F.3d 825 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 
   22 
requests them nationwide.
122
 Thus, many news organizations employ reporters in 
Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee to request federal mug shots.
123
 
D. Legislative Responses to Commercial Mug Shot Websites 
The outrage surrounding mug shot websites has prompted several state 
legislatures to pass laws limiting the websites’ activities in various ways. The wave of 
legislation began in 2013, when nine states and the District of Columbia introduced 
legislation about the use of mug shots online. Georgia, Illinois, Oregon, Texas, and Utah 
each passed legislation restricting activities by mug shot websites in 2013. So far in 2014, 
13 states are considering legislation that would impact mug shot websites, and Wyoming 
has enacted a law addressing mug shots this year. The legislation passed in 2013 and 
proposals for 2014 are outlined in the figures below. 
Most of 2013’s enacted legislation shares a common feature in that it specifically 
targets websites that remove or alter mug shots on their site for a fee, creating civil 
penalties for that business practice. The legislation also provides methods for individuals 
to request free removal of their mug shots from websites that solicit payment for removal. 
Table 1: 2013 Enacted Legislation Related to Mug Shots
124
 
State Law Summary 
Georgia H.B. 150, Act No. 188 Prohibits certain persons from collecting a fee 
for removing certain individuals' arresting 
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booking photographs from a website. 
Illinois S.B. 115, Public Act 98-
0555 
Provides that it is an unlawful practice for any 
person engaged in publishing or otherwise 
disseminating criminal record information 
through a print or electronic medium to solicit 
or accept the payment of a fee or other 
consideration to remove, correct, or modify 
said criminal record information. 
Oregon H.B. 3467, June 6, 2013, 
Chapter No. 330 
Requires individual seeking disclosure of 
photographic records of arrested person from 
law enforcement agency to submit written 
request to agency, in person and with payment 
of fees; limits scope of each request to 
photographic records of one arrested person; 
prohibits law enforcement agencies from 
publishing photographic records of arrested 
persons on Internet. 
Texas S.B. 1289, July 30, 2013, 
Chapter 1200 
Regulates business entities engaged in the 
publication or other dissemination of mug 
shots and other personal identifying 
information regarding the involvement of an 
individual in the criminal justice system; 
provides a civil penalty for violations. 
Provides an avenue to dispute records. 
Utah H.B. 408, April 26, 2013, 
Chapter. No. 404 
Enacts a provision relating to photographs of 
criminal suspects; prohibits county sheriffs 
from providing a copy of a booking 
photograph to a person if the photograph will 
be placed in a publication or posted on a 
website that requires a payment in order to 
remove the photograph; requires a person 
requesting a copy of a booking photograph to 
sign a statement that the photograph will not 
be placed in a publication or on a website that 
requires payment in order to remove the 
photograph; relates to penalties. 
 
The legislation pending in 2014 also generally provides for free removal of mug 
shots from commercial websites for those who can prove the charges were dropped or 
they were acquitted. Several states, however, have gone further: Florida and Georgia are 
considering bills that would severely restrict or cut off access to mug shots altogether. 
   24 
Further, two states’ bills (e.g. Missouri, Minnesota) do not require that an individual have 
been acquitted or had the charges dropped to require removal of the mug shot. For 
example, Minnesota H.B. 1940 provides that “if the individual was convicted of the 
crime listed, the individual may request that the Web site or publication alter the 
information posted to include no more than the individual's first name, last initial, and 
crime of conviction.”125 Additionally, some states are considering making access to mug 
shots more burdensome; Minnesota legislators are considering requiring requests to be 
made in person to the agency that has the original photograph and establishing fees of 
more than $5 for the photographs.
126
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Table 2: 2014 Legislation Related to Mug Shots
127
 
State Bill Summary 
Alabama H.B. 135 Requires the operator of a website publishing an arrest 
photograph of an individual to remove, at no charge, the 
photograph and information within a specified period after 
notice of acquittal, the charges were dropped, or other 
resolution of the charges without a conviction. Provides that 
failure to remove a photograph and information is a deceptive 
trade practice and provides remedies for violations under the 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 
California S.B. 1027 Prohibits a person who publishes criminal record information 
via print or electronic means from soliciting or accepting a fee 
or other consideration to remove, correct, or modify that 
information. Establishes civil penalties for violations. 
Colorado H.B. 1047 Requires a person who publishes booking photographs or 
other basic identification information on a publicly available 
commercial web site, upon request and without compensation, 
to remove the booking photograph and basic identification 
information of a person who is not charged, whose charges are 
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dismissed, or who is acquitted of the charges, or whose case is 
sealed. Authorizes a person whose booking photo or 
information is not removed to file a civil action to recover any 
damages caused by the failure. 
Florida H.B. 265 Prohibits county or municipal detention facilities from 
electronically publishing arrest booking photographs of 
certain arrestees. 
Florida H.B. 619 Requires removal of photograph from website without fee or 
compensation upon request by subject individual; provides 
requirements for request; provides that violations are subject 
to remedies under Florida Deceptive & Unfair Trade Practices 
Act. 
Florida S.B. 298 Prohibits a person who publishes or disseminates an arrest 
booking photograph through a publicly accessible print or 
electronic medium from soliciting or accepting payment of a 
fee or other consideration to remove, correct, or modify such 
photograph; authorizes an action to enjoin publication or 
dissemination of an arrest booking photograph if the publisher 
or disseminator unlawfully solicits or accepts a fee or other 
consideration to remove, correct, or modify such photograph. 
Georgia H.B. 845 Prohibits the disclosure of arrest booking photographs except 
under certain circumstances. 
Kentucky H.B. 51 Prohibits a person from using a booking photograph for a 
commercial purpose if that photograph will be posted in a 
publication or on a Web site, and the removal of the booking 
photograph requires the payment of a fee or other 
consideration. 
Kentucky S.B. 95 Prohibits a person from using criminal records, including 
booking photographs, for a commercial purpose if that 
information will be posted in a publication or on a Web site, 
and the removal of the information requires the payment of a 
fee or other consideration. 
Minnesota H.B. 1933 Identifying booking photos as public, but requiring requests 
for photos to be made in person to the agency that has the 
original photo and establishing a fee of no less than $5 per 
photograph requested. 
Minnesota H.B. 1940 Requiring, for receipt of a booking photo, contact information, 
a statement of purpose for the request, a list of locations and 
formats where the photograph will be published, and possible 
supplemental disclosures if the location or format of 
publication changes. Establishing that booking photos may 
not be published in media that require payment of a fee or 
consideration for removal, and creating a process for free 
removal. Restricting the information that may be listed for 
those convicted of crimes. 
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Minnesota  S.B. 1863 Requiring, for receipt of a booking photo, contact information, 
a statement of purpose for the request, a list of locations and 
formats where the photograph will be published, and possible 
supplemental disclosures if the location or format of 
publication changes. Establishing that booking photos may 
not be published in media that require payment of a fee or 
consideration for removal, and creating a process for free 
removal. Restricting the information that may be listed for 
those convicted of crimes. 
Missouri H.B. 1335 Prohibits businesses from requiring payment to remove a 
booking photograph and includes a petition process for an 
individual to have his or her booking photograph removed 
from the website. 
Missouri H.B. 1665 Requires a person publishing an arrest booking photograph on 
his or her internet website to remove such photograph upon 
the request of the individual whose photograph was published. 
New 
Jersey 
A.B. 2064 Exempts mug shots of arrestees who have not been convicted 
of the underlying offense from State’s open public records 
law. 
New 
Jersey 
A.B. 2177 Provides a uniform policy that all mug shots are to be made 
available to the public. 
New 
Jersey 
S.B. 961 Prohibits a person from charging a fee to stop publishing 
personal identifying information obtained through the 
criminal justice system. 
New York A.B. 8731 Relates to when booking photographs taken after arrest of a 
person or the defendant shall be made publicly available. 
South 
Carolina 
S.B. 700 Provides that a person or entity who publishes on the person 
or entity’s publicly available website a mug shot of a person 
whose charges have been discharged, dismissed, or the person 
has been found not guilty, shall, without fee or compensation, 
remove the mug shot from the person or entity's website 
within thirty days of the person sending a written request to 
the person or entity. 
Virginia S.B. 137 Makes it a Class 1 misdemeanor for the owner of a website to 
post both an arrest photo and solicit, request, or accept money 
for removing the photograph. 
Wyoming S.B. 53, 
Act 35 
Provides for removal of arrest photographs from websites that 
charge to remove photographs for free within 30 days of a 
written request accompanied by documentation that charges 
stemming from the arrest were resolved through acquittal or 
without conviction, or were expunged. 
   27 
This wave of legislation suggests the seriousness with which legislators view the 
issue. Some of the legislation, however, raises significant theoretical and constitutional 
questions, discussed below. The responses by legislatures, particularly those that change 
the rules for access to mug shots, draw into question deeper issues about the conflict 
between privacy rights and First Amendment rights. 
E. Right of Publicity Lawsuit in Ohio 
 Attorney Scott Ciolek from Toledo, Ohio, came up with what some called a novel 
way to tackle mug shot websites after several of his clients complained about them.
128
  
Three Ohio residents whose mug shots appeared on variety of sites, Debra Lashaway, 
Phillip Kaplan, and Otha Randall, filed suit against several commercial mug shot 
websites on December 3, 2012, in Lucas County Common Pleas Court in Ohio..
129
 The 
defendants in the case originally included Bustedmugshots.com, Justmugshots.com, 
Mugshotsonline.com, Findmugshots.com and Mugremove.com.
130
  
Claiming a violation of Ohio’s right of publicity statute,131 the complaint alleged 
that the plaintiffs represented a class of Ohio residents whose personas the websites used 
for commercial gain.
132
 The complaint also alleged unjust enrichment because the 
defendants collected money to have the mug shots removed, and “such sums represents 
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[sic] the proceeds of the illegal and unconsented exploitation of the persona of 
Plaintiffs.”133 The issue for the plaintiffs was not the publication of photos, but rather the 
payment demanded to remove them.
134
 He argued that the websites have a First 
Amendment right to publish the mug shots, but that they forfeited their constitutional 
protection by demanding payment for removal of the plaintiffs’ mug shots because the 
plaintiffs still have a property right in their own personas.
135
 Of course, the defendants 
responded that the plaintiffs failed to prove that their images had commercial value.
136
 
 Some commentators seemed hopeful about the lawsuit’s chances, even saying 
“Ciolek may have found a crucial gap in the mugshot industry's defenses.”137 The lawsuit 
is “‘not a trivial legal claim. In other words, it’s novel and it’s untested . . .’” Peter 
Scheer, director of the First Amendment Coalition, said.
138
 “‘[T]he results may differ in 
each state. I do think it is not a ridiculous stretch to say charging somebody to remove 
one’s mugshot from an internet site infringes that individuals’ right of publicity.’”139 
University of Toledo law school professor Llew Gibbons questioned the news value of 
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mug shots that are years old and remain online.
140
 “The problem is [the websites] have a 
mixed commercial motive. When they charge this fee for expedited takedown, it becomes 
another question. It becomes more and more in the commercial realm and out of the 
world of political speech.”141 Professor Allen Rostron concluded that “Ciolek can 
persuasively argue that mug shot companies have improperly wrung commercial value 
from the use of his clients’ personas. Indeed, the rapid growth of the mug shot industry 
demonstrates that images of arrestees, famous or not, have substantial commercial 
value.”142 
 Other experts, however, concluded that the mug shot websites should fall under 
the umbrella of the First Amendment’s protection. “The websites probably have a First 
Amendment right to publish the mug shots because this is lawfully obtained public 
information,” Ohio State University Moritz College of Law professor Daniel Tokaji told 
Huffington Post.
143
 “The practice of requiring payment to have them removed is 
unsavory, but probably not illegal.”144 
 The defendants removed Ciolek’s suit to the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio on August 9, 2013.
 145
 Several defendants were dismissed over the 
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following months because the owners of the sites could not be located.
146
 The proprietors 
of BustedMugshots.com and MugshotsOnline.com were the only remaining defendants 
by the time the parties reached a settlement on December 27, 2013.
147
 The terms of the 
settlement reportedly included a $7,500 payment to each of the three plaintiffs.
148
 The 
attorney for BustedMugshots.com and MugshotsOnline.com also said his clients ended 
their practice of charging fees to remove the mug shots.
149
 
E. The Harms of Mug Shots 
 Many individuals who have been featured on mug shot websites have recounted 
the harms that came to them as a result of the websites in the popular press. Max 
Birnbaum, a college student, told the Times that he lost out on a job working for a state 
representative because Google searches for his name turned up a mug shot from a drug 
arrest that will be off his record when he finishes a diversion program.
150
 “I know what I 
did was wrong, and I understand the punishment,” Birnbaum said.151 “But these Web 
sites are punishing me, and because I don’t have the money it would take to get my photo 
off them all, there is nothing I can do about it.”152 Harm to job prospects is a common 
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refrain among those who are pictured on mug shot websites.
153
 Janese Trimaldi, pictured 
in two mug shots on several websites, was daunted by the prospect of several mug shots 
from dropped charges being online.
154
 Trimaldi had just finished medical school and was 
working toward her residency placement.
155“‘If I wasn’t a level-headed, positive person, I 
would have seriously considered ending my own life,’” she wrote in a letter to an 
attorney filing suit against mug shot websites.
156
 
The release of a mug shot may also implicate constitutional fair trial rights.
157
 If a 
mug shot is released prior to a conviction, the image itself may tend to show the suspect 
in an unfair light. The ubiquity and cultural meaning of mug shots is crucial to this 
analysis; the link between mug shots and criminal misconduct, many argue, is clear: “The 
police mug shot has become an icon in contemporary visual culture. The pose, framing, 
and formal conventions of the image are easily recognized throughout the general public. 
It is an image that is taken to indicate criminality.”158 Courts have offered critical words 
about how the public interprets mug shots, arguing that they invade a person’s privacy at 
a crucial moment. “. . .[A] mug shot conveys much more than the appearance of the 
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pictured individual. Unlike a photograph taken under normal circumstances, it relates a 
number of facts about a person, including his expression at a humiliating moment and the 
fact that he has been booked on criminal charges.”159 The Sixth Circuit has described 
mug shots as conveying an “unmistakable badge of criminality.”160 Indeed, for decades, 
the mug shot format has been “so familiar, from ‘wanted’ posters in the post office, 
motion pictures and television, that the inference that the person involved has a criminal 
record, or has at least been in trouble with the police, is natural, perhaps automatic.”161 
The Barnes court ordered a new trial after the introduction of a defendant’s mug shots 
from a prior arrest.
162
 The government argued it sought to use the images for 
identification purposes only, but the court concluded that the mug shots too closely and 
improperly associated the defendant with past criminal conduct.
163
  
F. Journalists’ Interests in Mug Shots 
From the perspective of a content creator, recent responses to mug shot websites, 
including legislative responses and potential lawsuits related to the publication of mug 
shots, are concerning. The general tenor of the conversation surrounding these records  
has implications for those who publish content. Journalists see value for crime coverage 
in the ability to use mug shots. More broadly, a precedent that American policymakers 
and courts are willing to pull a previously-available type of record out of the public 
domain is troubling. Press autonomy and editorial discretion are arguably longstanding 
                                                 
159
 Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 99 (Norris, dissenting). 
 
160
 Eberhardt v. Bordenkircher, 605 F.2d 275, 280 (6th Cir.1979). 
 
161
 Barnes v. U.S., 365 F.2d 509, 510–11 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
 
162
 Id. at 511. 
 
163
 Id. 
   33 
First Amendment values that would be implicated by changes to public record policies. 
The recent shift in sentiment toward mug shots confronts head on what happens when the 
autonomy of the press and individual privacy and autonomy rights clash.  
Mug shots, journalists argue, offer value beyond the identification of suspects for 
law enforcement purposes. For the press, mug shots are a way to illustrate a story, offer 
context for a story, serve a community purpose, and can even be central to the story 
themselves. They can serve informational and entertainment purposes, as “[m]ug shots of 
famous individuals have been printed in tabloid newspapers . . .”164 Mug shots have also 
been used for educational purposes, “for instance, to demonstrate the toll of drug use to 
audiences of students.”165 
From a journalist’s perspective, the choice to publish mug shots serves a valuable 
goal. The practice of using identifying information in service of the public goals of 
knowing who is accused of committing crimes and oversight of the criminal justice 
system dates back to the American Revolution when “[t]he British used to arrest people 
in secret, and the public would never know who was arrested or why. Rebel colonists 
changed that by publishing the names of those who were wanted or were arrested.”166 
The commission of crime and the identities of those arrested are public 
information that informs readers and viewers about their communities, serving a public 
safety purpose and informing citizens about who commits crime around them. “Arrests 
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are news – and also public records – and identifying those in custody is important to 
society. It’s one role of an independent free press.”167  
Further, mug shots themselves shed light on the inner workings of the criminal 
justice system. “[T]ransparency in the criminal justice system is for the protection of the 
arrested. Secrecy imperils those in custody.”168 This transparency, journalists argue, 
allows media outlets to inform the public about the conditions inside the criminal justice 
system. 
The fact that somebody has been arrested is public information. Booking photos 
help us identify suspects but also people that have been wrongly arrested. . . It 
also tells us what happened to them when they were arrested. If they’ve been 
roughed up, those scars show up, and that’s a very important part of public 
oversight of what law enforcement is doing.
169
 
 
The Sixth Circuit wrote favorably about this public oversight function in finding 
that mug shots are public records, providing several examples of useful oversight 
functions.  
[R]elease of a photograph of a defendant can more clearly reveal the 
government’s glaring error in detaining the wrong person for an offense than can 
any reprint of only the name of an arrestee. Furthermore, mug shots can 
startlingly reveal the circumstances surrounding an arrest and initial incarceration 
of an individual in a way that written information cannot.
170
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The Sixth Circuit cited the example of the Rodney King beating, noting that, had 
the infamous video of police officers beating King never come to light, a mug shot 
depicting King’s injuries would have “alerted the world” that the officers had acted 
outside the bounds of the law.
171
 
Mug shots themselves often become part of the story, or trigger a story on their 
own. The January 2014 drunk driving and drag racing arrest of pop star Justin Bieber in 
Miami made headlines because Bieber, “[a]lways one to flash his pearly whites,” smiled 
broadly in his mug shot.
172
 Coverage by the press questioned Bieber’s state of mind, 
especially given that he had been driving, and his judgment. The story of his image in his 
mug shot, of course, could not be told without showing the mug shot itself. The mug shot 
of O.J. Simpson, displayed on the covers of Time and Newsweek magazines, sparked a 
national discussion about race after Time darkened the image, changing Simpson’s 
appearance dramatically.
173
 Of course, the media coverage itself became the story due to 
Time’s portrayal of Simpson. Nonetheless, other media could not cover the story without 
showing the two versions of the mug shot. The mug shot thus became the story’s 
centerpiece. 
Proprietors of mug shot websites defend the value of their work along similar 
lines. “No one should have to go to the courthouse to find out if their kid’s baseball coach 
has been arrested, or if the person they’re going on a date with tonight has been arrested,” 
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Arthur D’Antonio III, founder of JustMugshots.com, told The New York Times.174 “Our 
goal is to make that information available online, without having to jump through any 
hoops.”175 
III. THE GROWTH OF TORTS TIED TO UNAUTHORIZED USES OF IDENTITY 
The plaintiffs in Lashaway et al v. JustMugshots.com et al, sued under Ohio’s 
right of publicity statute to vindicate their rights after being pictured on mug shot 
websites. Claims for the right of publicity, which has developed to protect a commercial 
interest in one’s identity, and the tort claim for misappropriation of one’s identity, 
premised on an invasion of privacy, evolved from the early recognition of the 
misappropriation of identity. Both focus on uses of individuals’ identities without their 
authorization. This species of claim has seen significant evolution during the last century. 
This section outlines the development of claims based on one’s identity. 
A.  Elements of the Identity-Based Claims: The Right of Publicity and 
Misappropriation of Name or Likeness 
 
 To begin, outlining the elements of the claims will assist in understanding their 
development. Appropriation of name or likeness and the right of publicity are similar in 
most ways. The torts have one significant difference noted by commentators. 
Many states have adopted the Restatements (Second) of Torts model for 
appropriation of name or likeness as a subset of privacy protections. Under this approach, 
“one who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject 
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to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”176 If mental harms tied to privacy 
rights are part of the damages alleged, the claim likely falls under this rubric.
177
 
The right of publicity has generally developed to focus more on protection of the 
commercial value of an individual’s image. The elements of infringement of this right are 
that the defendant “without permission, has used some aspect of identity or persona in 
such a way that plaintiff is identifiable from defendant's use” and “defendant’s use is 
likely to cause damage to the commercial value of that persona.”178 As the following 
section demonstrates:  
While the right of publicity evolved historically from ‘appropriation privacy,’ the 
right of publicity is now a separate and distinct legal concept which recognizes 
the proprietary and commercial value of a person’s identity and persona. Simply 
put, an infringement of the right of publicity focuses upon injury to the 
pocketbook, while an invasion of ‘appropriation privacy’ focuses upon injury to 
the psyche.
179
 
 
Some courts have concluded that the right of publicity only protects economic harm, 
differing from the tort of misappropriation’s protection of privacy.180 State statutes do not 
all follow this template, however—some recognize a unified right to control one’s 
identity, not distinguishing between the right of publicity and the tort of 
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misappropriation.
181
 These differing approaches raise questions about what type of claim 
a plaintiff may assert for an unauthorized use of his or her identity. The next section 
outlines the history of these torts   
B. The Beginning: Privacy Rights Develop 
Claims related to the unauthorized use of identity are generally traced to Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis’ “The Right to Privacy.”182 This work sparked much of the 
body of privacy law in the United States,
183
 although Professor Amy Gajda offers a 
compelling argument that courts were willing to acknowledge privacy interests prior to 
the publication of that seminal article.
184
 “The Right to Privacy” did, either way, serve as 
a catalyst for courts to more directly recognize a right to privacy in the common law and 
for states to consider statutory protections.
185
 Authors Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis, bothered by the aggressive press of the late nineteenth century and its practice 
of publishing personal information and photographs, complained that the press was 
“overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency” and 
had built a “trade” around “gossip.”186  
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One catalyst for what they saw as an increase in privacy invasions was changing 
technology. The authors expressed concern that “[i]nstantaneous photographs and 
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and 
numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is 
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”187 Also crucial to 
Warren and Brandeis’ analysis was the common law’s increasing recognition of harms 
beyond those to the physical self or tangible property—emotional and mental harms, too, 
began to warrant protection.
188
 “The intense intellectual and emotional life, and the 
heightening of sensations which came with the advance of civilization, made it clear to 
men that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical things. 
Thoughts, emotions, and sensations demanded legal recognition . . .”189 
Following Warren and Brandeis’ call for a right to privacy, courts had mixed 
reactions to embracing the protections for which they advocated. The New York Court of 
Appeals declined to recognize a common law claim for misappropriation of identity in 
1902.
190
 A flour company had printed lithographs depicting Abigail Roberson, a young 
woman, on its packaging and advertising.
191
 Roberson claimed she was “greatly 
humiliated” by having her “face and picture on this advertisement” and alleged that “her 
good name [was] attacked, causing her great distress and suffering, both in body and 
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mind . . . .”192 The image of her was flattering, but people recognized her and “jeered,” 
she said, and she was “bedridden.”193 The appellate court in the case had concluded that 
the claim was new and few precedents would support it, but nonetheless held that the 
flour company “had invaded what is called a ‘right of privacy,’ in other words, the right 
to be let alone.”194 The Court of Appeals, however, was concerned that a right to privacy, 
if recognized at common, would become a tort without limits or bounds, inviting too 
much litigation.
 195
 On this logic, the court refused to create a right to privacy at common 
law in New York, and instead invited the legislature to craft a statute to recognize such 
rights if it deemed such rights valuable.
196
 The New York legislature did just that in 1903, 
passing the first privacy statute
197
 in the United States, which forbade the “unpermitted 
use of name or likeness for advertising or trade purposes.”198  
 Of the cases that attempted to claim a right of privacy, “the tort of appropriation 
of identity was the favorite of all in privacy’s early successes in litigation.”199 A court 
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first recognized this right in Roberson in 1905.
200
 The Georgia Supreme Court adopted 
the right in Pavesich, in which the plaintiff’s image was used in an advertisement for 
insurance and falsely suggested he had purchased insurance with the company.
201
 
Establishing the right to privacy, the court approvingly cited the dissenting opinion from 
Roberson, in which Judge Gray wrote that the right of privacy already existed in the law 
as “the complement of the right to the immunity of one’s person. The individual has 
always been entitled to be protected in the exclusive use and enjoyment of that which is 
his own.
202
 The court acknowledged that conflicts may arise between privacy rights and 
other rights, but that commercial uses of one’s likeness simply crossed the line too clearly 
into an invasion of rights.
203
 The court concluded by saying: 
So thoroughly satisfied are we that the law recognizes, within proper limits, as a 
legal right, the right of privacy, and that the publication of one's picture without 
his consent by another as an advertisement, for the mere purpose of increasing the 
profits and gains of the advertiser, is an invasion of this right, that we venture to 
predict that the day will come that the American bar will marvel that a contrary 
view was ever entertained by judges of eminence and ability . . . .”204 
 
Thus, the tort of misappropriation of identity had entered the lexicon of American 
legislatures and courts. 
C. An Economic Rationale Emerges 
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As the twentieth century progressed and public figures increasingly began to sue 
for uses of their image, courts began to struggle with the privacy label originally attached 
to claims for the misappropriation of the plaintiff’s identity. Harold R. Gordon asserted 
that the confusion arose because litigants who were public figures focused on the privacy 
aspects of their claims.
205
 A stark privacy label on claims by celebrities seemed 
disingenuous to courts, since these individuals held themselves out as public figures and 
promoted their images in other ways that, to these celebrities, were apparently not 
objectionable.
206
 An illustrative case is O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.,207 in which football 
star Davey O’Brien sued for the unauthorized use of his image in a calendar promoting 
Pabst Blue Ribbon beer. O’Brien had turned down alcohol endorsements and was an 
advocate for temperance—and was thus quite offended to be associated with Pabst’s 
product.
208
 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of his claims for an 
invasion of his privacy, concluding that he did not have a privacy interest in avoiding 
having his image used for promotional purposes because he had sought to have his image 
used in promotion before.
209
 The court seemed to conclude that because O’Brien was not 
willing to allow the use of his image for the promotion of beer, he could not recover the 
value of the unauthorized endorsement—it would seem hypocritical to collect damages 
for a use one found disagreeable. The court did not, in the context of O’Brien’s claim, 
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consider that O’Brien should be able to assert a right to entirely prevent the use of his 
image simply because he did not want it used in connection with Pabst’s product. 
Thus, courts began to turn to economic rationales for the right to one’s identity. 
Judge Jerome Frank, writing for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, coined the phrase 
“right of publicity” in Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc,210 a 
foundational case emphasizing the economic rationale for the right to control uses of 
one’s identity by recognizing it as an assignable property right. A baseball player had 
signed a contract giving the plaintiff the exclusive rights to print baseball cards using his 
name, likeness, and personal information.
211
 Topps Chewing Gum then printed its own 
cards using the same player’s name, likeness, and personal information.212 Haelen sued 
under New York’s privacy statute, arguing that the player had assigned his right of 
privacy, which included his commercially valuable image, to it, and so Topps was liable 
for using the image since the player had exclusively assigned the right to Haelen.
213
 The 
court concluded that, “in addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in 
New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his 
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture.”214 
The court argued that famous people do not have their “feelings bruised through public 
exposure of their likenesses,” but they “would feel sorely deprived” if they could not 
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control the commercial value of their images.
215
 The court concluded that without a right 
of publicity that they could exclusively assign, celebrities could not reap the profits of 
their fame.
216
 
Following the Second Circuit’s opinion, Professor Melville Nimmer published an 
influential article articulating the right of publicity’s foundations.217 The article outlines 
the various bodies of law that he felt were inadequate to explain the right of publicity, 
including privacy.
218
 Nimmer argued privacy was insufficient to ensure one could control 
her image because a celebrity waived her privacy interests by putting her persona in the 
public eye, although Nimmer acknowledged that a celebrity would still had a right to 
privacy in those parts of her life she kept private.
219
 He concluded that trademark and 
unfair competition law, too, were inadequate to explain the right of publicity because 
they require some type of confusion by consumers, and not all unauthorized uses of a 
person’s image mislead consumers into believing the person whose image is used 
endorses the message construed.
220
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This language emphasizing the economic value of the right of publicity carried 
through when Prosser divided the general claim of “invasion of privacy” into four distinct 
torts in 1960.
221
 The fourth tort, “appropriation,” covered the “right of publicity” claims 
that had come before American courts in the previous half-century.
222
 This tort required 
first, that some part of the plaintiff’s identifiable identity was appropriated.223 Next, the 
question under Prosser’s conception was whether the defendant appropriated the identity 
“for his own advantage.”224 Prosser noted that statutory appropriation of image claims 
require pecuniary gain by the defendant, whereas the common law was likely less 
stringent as to the type of damage required.
225
 He also commented that courts faced a 
conflict between press rights and the right of publicity because the press operates for 
profit.
226
 To protect First Amendment rights, early courts “were compelled to hold that 
there must be some closer and more direct connection, beyond the mere fact that the 
newspaper is sold; and that the presence of advertising matter in adjacent columns does 
not make any difference.”227 Relying on the language of Haelen Laboratories, Prosser 
asserted that it was “sufficiently evident” that his fourth tort differed from the other 
privacy torts because the plaintiff’s interest was “not so much a mental as a proprietary” 
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interest in the use of his identity.
228
 To Prosser, this meant that a right to control one’s 
identity was rooted in property.
229
 
D. Protection for Identity Grows 
Through the next several decades, states began to codify the right of publicity. 
States also chose to recognize rights based on misappropriation of name or likeness. 
Today, 21 states recognize the right of publicity by statute.
230
 Others recognize identity 
rights through common law.
231
 Appendix 1 outlines, state-by-state, the extent of the 
adoption of claims based on one’s identity.  
The Supreme Court has decided just a single case involving the right of publicity, 
in 1977.
232
 Under Ohio’s right of publicity statute, “human cannonball” performer Hugo 
Zacchini sued when a television station broadcast his entire act during a nightly 
newscast.
233
 The Court narrowly held that a First Amendment defense did not shield the 
television station from liability because it had broadcast his “entire act.”234 This display, 
the Court argued, “pose[d] a substantial threat to the economic value of that 
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performance” and was akin to preventing Zacchini from “charging an admission fee” 
because viewers would not pay to see a performance that they could see in its entirety 
from the comfort of their living rooms.
235
 The Court saw the claim as related to an 
economic interest, not a privacy one—it was “the right of the individual to reap the 
reward of his endeavors” at stake, and this had “little to do with protecting feelings or 
reputation.”236 Zacchini’s dissenters addressed the privacy and First Amendment 
concerns involved in the case, calling for greater deference to the press.
237
 Justice Powell 
advocated for a First Amendment defense unless the plaintiff could show “that the news 
broadcast was a subterfuge or cover for private or commercial exploitation.”238 He would 
begin not from the performer’s interest in his work, but rather from the press’ motivation 
for and use of the work—a news use would be protected from a right of publicity 
claim.
239
 
Given the development of the concept of misappropriation of identity and the dual 
privacy and property concerns, great debate has arisen in recent years as to whether non-
celebrities can make claims under the right of publicity rubric. Based on labor theory, 
some contend that only celebrities have a right of publicity because of the labor that they 
put into crafting their image, finding support from the Court’s opinion in Zacchini.240 
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Those who argue the right extends to celebrities and non-celebrities alike argue that “the 
fact that most reported right of publicity decisions involve ‘celebrity’ plaintiffs is a 
product of the economics of litigation, not of inherent legal rights. . . [T]he law should 
not draw a critical legal line between ‘celebrities’ and ‘non-celebrities’ for purposes of 
the right of publicity.”241 Indeed, the trend has been to recognize a commercial value 
under the right of publicity for all individuals, regardless of their status.
242
 
With this history and development in mind, a question naturally arises: if anyone, 
regardless of how much work he puts into cultivating a public image, can assert a right of 
publicity to control the use of his or her image, what are the theoretical underpinnings for 
such a right? Does any single, unifying theory explain the protection of individuals’ 
identities? And how should legislatures and courts protect these rights in an era of digital 
information and instant celebrity? The next section seeks to examine the theory 
surrounding this right to one’s identity and explores how it conflicts with First 
Amendment rights to publish. 
IV.  TWO APPROACHES TO AUTONOMY THEORY: CONTROL OF INFORMATION AND 
AUTONOMOUS PUBLISHING DECISIONS  
 
The concept of autonomy as a rationale for the conferral of rights has proved 
compelling to many theorists. At the same time, the principles underlying the idea of 
autonomy highlight many of the tensions between the First Amendment and the 
arguments surrounding the use of mug shots. The two overlap in a number of ways. On 
one hand, private citizens, some argue, can achieve autonomy if the law advances their 
control over information about them. On the other hand, journalists argue that the press 
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can only function if journalists are given editorial discretion – the autonomy to determine 
what to publish. This thesis relies on the conflicts between these conceptions of 
autonomy for both journalists and those pictured in mug shots to emphasize the 
complexity of the two positions, as well as offering a possible solution to these conflicts 
as viewed through the lens of the use of mug shots.  
Some theorists argue that the idea of autonomy best justifies the bestowal of 
rights and that “other values possess their worth only because rational, autonomous 
agents find them worth pursuing,” a perspective that traces back to the work of Immanuel 
Kant.
243
 Kant contended that morality itself is rooted in autonomy, as autonomous beings 
are able to reflect on their choices and decide how to act.
244
 In this sense, a choice to obey 
moral laws is still autonomous if made after a process of deliberation.
245
 A government’s 
recognition of its citizens’ autonomy is crucial, as “a legitimate government is one whose 
authority citizens can recognize while still regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, 
rational agents.”246 For many theorists who adopt an autonomy model, “the spirit of Kant 
suffuses ascriptions of autonomy, and freedom of the will undergirds the sovereign 
prerogative to make decisions for oneself and to act accordingly.”247 
A wide variety of definitions and interpretations of this autonomy principle exist, 
and the term “autonomy” is itself loaded with meaning: 
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[Autonomy] is used sometimes as an equivalent of liberty . . . , sometimes as 
equivalent to self-rule or sovereignty, sometimes as identical with freedom of the 
will. It is equated with dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, 
responsibility, and self-knowledge. It is identified with qualities of self-assertion, 
with critical reflection, with freedom from obligation, with absence of external 
causation, with knowledge of one’s own interests.248  
 
 A commonly accepted view of autonomy concludes that “[i]n the cacophony of 
pluralist culture, the ‘idea has entered very deep’ that every person possesses her own 
originality, and that it is of ‘crucial moral importance’ for each to lead a life that is 
distinctively self-made. Autonomy both expresses this idea and promotes its 
realization.”249 This model calls back to Professor Thomas Scanlon’s approach, in which 
“a person must see himself as sovereign in deciding what to believe and in weighing 
competing reasons for action.”250 This understanding, complemented by similar ideas 
from many theorists and courts, arises both in the context of press autonomy and the 
autonomy of those pictured in mug shots. 
A. Autonomy Interests Surrounding the Control of Identity 
 As the law surrounding the use, or misuse, of identity has developed in the United 
States, arguments bolstering these rights by reference to autonomy values have followed. 
The right, as discussed above, originated in privacy law. Beginning with Warren and 
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Brandeis, several values akin to autonomy emerged.
251
 The framework for privacy 
Warren and Brandeis had in mind was “the right to be let alone.”252 They rooted an 
individual’s right to control his own papers in “the more general right to the immunity of 
the person, — the right to one’s personality.”253 They concluded by advocating for the 
privacy torts recognized by states today either through common law or by statute, as 
adopted by state legislatures. 
 Theorists have defined privacy itself “as an autonomy or control over the 
intimacies of personal identity.”254 Based on Warren and Brandeis’ defense of “a civil 
right to control information about oneself,” a concern for “the principle of inviolate 
personality” grew in American jurisprudence.255 Autonomy in the privacy context derives 
from Kantian theory, viewing citizens as ends, rather than means to an end.
256
  Privacy 
invasions interfere with an individual’s autonomy, and so privacy protections can be seen 
as a means to protecting that autonomy.
257
 Laws based in privacy serve both individual 
and societal interests in autonomy. Professor Rodney Smolla noted the internal and 
external nature of these protections.
258
 “Laws protecting privacy are the means through 
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which the collective acknowledges rules of civility that are designed to affirm human 
autonomy and dignity.”259 
 Early courts identified an autonomy interest in controlling information about 
one’s identity. The Pavesich case nicely outlines autonomy concerns.260 The court opined 
that the right to enjoyment of life embodies more than just the “right to breathe and 
exist”—it means “[a]n individual has a right to enjoy life in any way that may be most 
agreeable and pleasant to him, according to his temperament and nature, provided that in 
such enjoyment he does not invade the rights of his neighbor, or violate public law or 
policy.”261 The Pavesich court concluded that the advertisement violated a right to 
privacy because Pavesich’s “form and features . . . are his own,” and the insurance 
company did not have a right to decide for Pavesich how his image would be used.
262
 
Pavesich deserved the control his image and the extent to which he was a private 
citizen.
263
 “One who desires to live a life of partial seclusion has a right to choose the 
times, places, and manner in which and at which he will submit himself to the public 
gaze.”264 
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The concept of privacy dominates much Western thinking about self-realization 
and control over one’s own development,265 and it has countless definitions.266 The 
concept of “control,” however, is central to many of these definitions: 
[P]rivacy has been defined as control over: ‘knowledge about oneself,’ ‘the 
intimacies of personal identity,’ ‘acquaintance with one's personal affairs,’ 
‘disclosures of confidential information by others when disclosures do not, or no 
longer, serve associational interests,’ ‘decisions concerning matters that draw 
their meaning and value from the agent's love, caring, or liking,’ and finally 
‘control over who can sense us.’267 
 
In Professor Jonathan Kahn’s view, “privacy recognizes and protects the conditions 
necessary for proper individuation and realization of the self over time,” a central tenet of 
the concept of autonomy.
268
 This control over one’s identity, according to Kahn, is the 
most important value served by privacy.
269
 This autonomy-as-control model reflects the 
Supreme Court’s conception of privacy, as well. The Court has commented that “both the 
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common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual’s control 
of information concerning his or her person.”270 
Legal protections for privacy hinge on “a concern to protect the basic dignity” 
involved in allowing a person to define himself and make his own choices “with a 
measure of autonomy and control over the process of developing an individuated self, 
capable of human flourishing.”271 Professor Ruth Gavison adopts a similar control-
focused conception of privacy as a “concern over our accessibility to others: the extent to 
which we are known to others, the extent to which others have physical access to us, and 
the extent to which we are the subject of others’ attention.”272 In this sense, Gavison and 
Kahn’s approaches both embrace autonomy as the ability of one to define his identity and 
control its accessibility. Gavison, however, outlines a wide variety of values served by 
privacy, autonomy not the least among them.
273
 Professor Charles Fried, too, agrees that 
privacy is best conceived as “the control we have over information about ourselves.”274 
Fried would entirely justify laws aimed at protecting privacy on the grounds that 
individuals should be able to control their identities.
275
 
 Professor Randall Bezanson similarly rests his conception of privacy on the idea 
of giving individuals a form of autonomy by allowing them to define their personalities 
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by controlling information about them.
276
 Under this view, “the object of privacy should 
be to give the individual control over the disclosure of confidential personal information 
in a more complex milieu of personal and social relationships.”277 He argues that Warren 
and Brandeis’ century-old view was not up-to-date with a 1990 world and has failed to 
remain relevant across differences between the social and economic conditions between 
the two periods.
278
 Warren and Brandeis, Bezanson contends, fell a bit short in offering a 
theory of privacy that could withstand the test of time.
279
 He submits a more timeless 
approach that would grant individuals more control over personal information itself, 
rather than focusing on “social controls of information” like the institutional press.280 
This approach aligns nicely with the concept of autonomy in the privacy context, giving 
individuals control over their information and ultimately, their image. 
Justifications for rights in one’s identity have expanded, just as the law has, 
beyond autonomy theory based in privacy considerations, however. The right of publicity 
and all its economic and property trappings may be best conceived as protecting 
individuals’ rights to “autonomous self-definition.”281 The right of publicity uniquely 
implicates autonomy concerns because “the things and people with which individuals 
choose to associate reflect their character and values. An individual's choices therefore 
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can be viewed as the text of her identity, and unauthorized uses of a person's identity in 
connection with products or services threaten to recreate that text and affect the way the 
individual is perceived by others.”282 Professor Mark McKenna would distinguish the 
autonomy interest inherent in a right of publicity claim from other privacy interests 
because with publicity rights, an individual’s concern is not in maintaining anonymity or 
avoiding commercial exploitation.
283
 Instead, outrage at violations in publicity rights is 
based in the unease that the “choices we make with respect to the cultural objects and 
images we incorporate into our lives play an important role in reflecting our 
personalities.”284 In this sense, violations of the right of publicity directly impact an 
individual’s ability to shape his identity and determine his own associations—regardless 
of the economic value of that identity.
285
 McKenna notes a number of examples of 
celebrities’ choices not to identify with certain brands because of the implications of 
being associated, arguing that these choices demonstrate that “avoiding particular 
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associations was important to the integrity of their identities.”286 Autonomy is critical in 
this analysis because “[i]f the overall picture of an individual's character is made up of 
the messages conveyed by her associational decisions, then unauthorized use of her 
identity interferes with her autonomy because the third party takes at least partial control 
over the meaning associated with her.”287 This conception calls back to Kahn and 
Gavison’s models that emphasize control over information about oneself as crucial to 
autonomy.  
An individual, celebrity or not, may have “both emotional and economic” 
interests in uses of her identity.
288
 “[W]hile the autonomy interest implicated by 
commercial use of one's identity is shared by all, the damages that flow from those 
violations may vary widely.”289 From McKenna’s perspective, this means the commercial 
value of a person’s identity is less important to the claim than the intrusion on the 
person’s ability to define him or herself.290 He notes that “all individuals share the 
interest in autonomous self-definition,” which means that regardless of level of fame, 
“every individual should be able to control uses of her identity that interfere with her 
ability to define her own public character.”291 False endorsement claims clearly implicate 
this interest, but so do other claims in which the meaning an individual has crafted for 
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himself is “destabilized.”292 For private citizens in particular, “uses that violate 
anonymity, secrecy, or solitude” infringe on autonomy.293 
 Autonomy in the context of a right of publicity action, conceived as an 
individual’s right to control information about herself, bridges the gap between the right 
of publicity and its original roots as a privacy concern under misappropriation of identity. 
Although celebrities have often used the right of publicity to vindicate unauthorized uses 
of their images, autonomy concerns animate the harm inherent in violations of the right 
of publicity for celebrities and ordinary citizens alike. Either way, an unauthorized use of 
one’s name, image or likeness interferes with one’s ability to define his character. The 
foregoing suggests that, for either tort related to one’s identity, autonomy can be 
conceived as one’s interest in controlling information about himself, whether the interest 
leans more toward a privacy concern or an economic one. This desire to act 
autonomously by controlling information about oneself, however, comes into tension 
with press autonomy when the press and other publishers of information choose to 
publish information individuals, public figures or not, would rather keep private. The 
next section addresses the theoretical underpinnings of this press autonomy. 
B. Autonomy Interests Surrounding the Right to Publish 
 The First Amendment declares, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”294 Discussions of autonomy have “dominated the 
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Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence” related to this right.295 The autonomy 
value, as applied to the press, appears throughout First Amendment theory, dating back to 
John Milton and John Stuart Mill. In Areopagatica, Milton emphasized liberty and 
criticized the practice of censorship as infringing on that liberty.
296
 Mill further argued 
that government suppression of opinions withdraws valuable discourse from the public 
sphere, thwarting opportunities for the society to discern truth and harming individuals’ 
liberty.
297
 These early works served as the foundation for many later doctrines, including 
autonomy-based theories of the First Amendment. 
Theorists who ascribe to an autonomy model of free speech generally conclude 
that “respect for autonomy requires very broad freedoms of speech. . . [O]nly coercive 
speech or speech that is used to invade the private rights of others can justifiably be 
prohibited under autonomy-based principles.”298 Government restrictions on speech 
should be viewed with great suspicion, and “[g]overnment behaves manipulatively, and 
thereby infringes on autonomy, whenever it prohibits speech based on fears that people 
might be persuaded by the speech’s message.”299 
The autonomy value can serve both the individual and society at large. Professor 
Thomas Emerson articulated a view of the First Amendment that justifies its existence for 
                                                 
295
 Geoffrey R. Stone, Autonomy and Distrust, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1171 (1993). 
 
296
 JOHN MILTON, AEROPAGATICA (1644). 
 
297
 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
 
298
 Fallon, supra note 243, at 881. See also C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of 
Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1977) (concluding that only manipulative speech can be restricted under 
his liberty model, one approach to the First Amendment based in autonomy-like values). 
 
299
 Fallon, supra note 243, at 881. 
 
   60 
the protection of both individual self-fulfillment interests in autonomy and societal 
interests in autonomy.
300
 In Emerson’s view, free speech allows individuals to reach self-
realization by making their own choices.
301
 Free speech, through this autonomous activity 
by individuals, also serves society by allowing citizens to discuss and debate issues to 
reach the truth, harkening back to Mill’s early concerns about restrictions on speech that 
would remove important discussion from public discourse.
302
  
Other free speech theories based in autonomy principles focus more on the 
individual’s own development and less on what autonomy contributes to society. 
Professor Martin Redish concluded that only “individual self-realization” fully justifies 
free speech, as the United States adopted a democratic model of government to allow for 
this self-realization.
303
 For Redish, this individual self-realization encompasses both 
one’s ability to develop his own “powers and abilities” as an individual and “the 
individual’s control of his or her own destiny through making life-affecting decisions.”304 
This decision-making element is also critical to Susan H. Williams’ view of autonomy.305 
Williams promotes a “conception of autonomy [that] focuses on choice: self-
determination is understood as exercised through the process of choosing.”306 Thus, 
under Williams’ approach, the key is whether the person’s choices for his life originate 
                                                 
300
 THOMAS I. EMERSON, SYSTEMS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1969). 
 
301
 EMERSON, SYSTEMS, supra note 300, at 6–9. 
 
302
 Id. at 7. 
 
303
 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 
 
304
 Id. 
 
305
 WILLIAMS, supra note 248 at 41. 
 
306
 Id. 
 
   61 
within himself—truly autonomous choices—or whether the choices originate outside the 
agent.
307
  
Professor C. Edwin Baker’s liberty model similarly focuses on the protection of 
free speech against restrictions by government or society that impinge on autonomy of 
the individual.
308
 Baker’s theory is rooted in the autonomy underlying social contract 
doctrine—citizens respect and buy into a society and government that, in turn, respect 
their own autonomy.
309
 “The legitimacy of the legal order depends, in part, on it 
respecting the autonomy that it must attribute to the people whom it asks to obey its laws. 
Despite the plethora of values served by speech, the need for this respect . . . provides the 
proper basis for giving free speech constitutional status.”310  
In his model, however, Baker argued for a distinction between the Speech and 
Press Clauses of the First Amendment, arguing that the press only deserves First 
Amendment protection for its institutional value in serving democracy.
311
 Supreme Court 
Justice Potter Stewart first reached the conclusion that the Press Clause was a structural 
provision in a well-known 1975 article.
312
 Stewart argued that “the Free Press Clause 
extends protection to an institution. The publishing business is, in short, the only 
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organized private business that is given explicit constitutional protection.”313 Stewart 
viewed the goal of the Press Clause as “creat[ing] a fourth institution outside the 
Government as an additional check on the three official branches.”314 Empirical studies 
of the Supreme Court’s free speech and press decisions, however, counsel against this 
distinction.
315
 In reality, the Court has not “declared that the Press Clause has any 
meaning apart from the Speech Clause.”316 Indeed, in his concurrence in First National 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, Chief Justice Burger examined the Press Clause’s history and 
proclaimed that “it was not meant to be a source of unique protections for the institutional 
press but was meant merely as an extension of the Speech Clause, guaranteeing all people 
the ability to express ideas through ‘every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of 
information and opinion.’”317  
Prior to the second half of the twentieth century, “[w]ithout case law recognizing 
robust First Amendment protection for the press, courts often felt free to chastise 
reporters or editors who crossed the line of fair play in their news judgment.”318 Indeed, 
“the press” had an entirely different meaning—in the eighteenth century, the concept of 
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the press “referred less to a journalistic enterprise than to the technology of printing and 
the opportunities for communication that the technology created,” and the Press Clause 
gave people the right “to publish their views,” rather than specific freedom for 
“journalists to pursue their craft.”319 Technological developments toward the end of the 
nineteenth century resulted in newspapers becoming “large and profitable enterprises” 
with employees who gathered and reported the news and commentary, eventually 
growing into the mass media we recognize today.
320
 This further suggests that the idea of 
autonomy applicable to free speech also ought to apply to the press. 
Bezanson notes that while an individual’s personal speech is not disseminated by 
the press, “in separately recognizing freedom of the press, the framers do not appear to 
have held a radically different view of the press’s speech (as opposed to its identity as a 
speaker) from that held for individual speech.”321 Most importantly, for the purpose of 
autonomy theory, the functions of the institutional press and individual free speech do not 
suggest that a different theoretical framework should apply to the two clauses. 
[T] he same process of intentional, independent, and free-willed judgment leading 
to the formation and expression of one's own beliefs, values, and ideas that is 
protected for individual speech under the free speech guarantee, is one that, by 
analogy, seems also to fit the independent, non-self-regarding, reasoned process 
of judgment that best describes the press in the performance of its classic 
checking and informing functions. The institutional analogue to the exercise of 
communicative free will by individuals under the speech guarantee is the exercise 
of editorial judgment by the press.
322
 
                                                 
319
 David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 446 (2002). 
 
320
 Id. at 447. 
 
321
 Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of Editorial Judgment, 78 NEB. L. REV. 754, 758 (1999). 
 
322
 Id. at 758–59. 
 
   64 
Other theorists have followed this framework, concluding that justifications for 
free speech similarly apply to a free press, and autonomy is crucial for both individual 
speakers and the press. “[F]reedom of the press means independence from government in 
decisions about whether and what to publish.”323 Bezanson wrote that independence for 
the press occurs when it is “free of forces from government or from outside of 
government that compromise the free independent judgment of those assigned the task of 
writing and composing the publication.”324 
The Supreme Court has embraced an approach to the First Amendment that 
recognizes the autonomy of the press. The Court has announced that it will not interfere 
with “the day-to-day editorial decisions of broadcast licensees,” concluding that 
“[j]ournalistic discretion would in many ways be lost” with governmental regulation of 
journalists’ speech.325 In Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, a case striking down a 
Florida statute that gave political candidates a right to reply to criticism by newspapers, 
the court recognized the importance of an autonomous press.
326
 Writing for the Court, 
Chief Justice Burger concluded 
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and 
advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions 
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of 
public issues and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise 
of editorial control and judgment.”327 
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More recently, the Court emphasized the vast number of entities that 
autonomously publish information, particularly in the context of “the vast democratic 
forums of the Internet.”328 In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, Justice Stevens 
wrote that “[a]ny person or organization with a computer connected to the Internet can 
‘publish’ information.”329 The opinion highlighted the control individual publishers have 
over their contents, noting that “government agencies, educational institutions, 
commercial entities, advocacy groups, and individuals . . . may either make their material 
available to the entire pool of Internet users, or confine access to a selected group, such as 
those willing to pay for the privilege.”330 This framework that revolves around 
autonomous speakers has worked its way into both First Amendment theory and the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. Autonomy derived for speakers from 
the First Amendment, however, conflicts with the autonomy inherent in laws that give 
individuals control over information about themselves. The next section examines how 
courts have solved this conflict.  
C. The Stage is Set: Autonomy Interests Clash  
 
Individuals’ autonomy interest in controlling information about themselves 
naturally runs into trouble when others want to publish information about them. The clash 
of these interests is an issue courts have often addressed by providing speakers with a 
defense. Courts have developed several tests for resolving the conflict between First 
Amendment interests and the right of publicity. Three tests dominate the discussion of the 
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specific clash between the First Amendment and the right of publicity. In recent years, 
the courts have often relied on the transformative use test, derived from copyright law’s 
fair use doctrine. The Rogers test, also popular with courts, originates in trademark law. 
Finally, the predominant use test focuses on the extent of the commercial nature of the 
defendant’s use. Beyond these formal tests, courts also balance whether information is 
newsworthy against claims that the use infringes on its subject’s autonomy. Courts have 
articulated several factors that contribute to a decision that a use of information is 
newsworthy, including whether the information was already in the public domain, the 
subject of the information’s societal status, the context in which the information appears, 
and whether the information was used for commercial purposes. 
1. Tests for the right of publicity 
i. Transformative use test 
Copyright law’s fair use test331 emerged as a way to balance First Amendment 
interests against right of publicity claims in Comedy III Products, Inc. v. Saderup.
332
 The 
case involved T-shirts depicting the Three Stooges; the defendant was an artist who drew 
portraits and imposed them on T-shirts. The court acknowledged the difficulty of 
weighing the two values, noting that “any such test must incorporate the principle that the 
right of publicity cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, be a right to control the 
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celebrity’s image by censoring disagreeable portrayals.”333 The court emphasized that 
this principle holds especially true for celebrities who have sought fame because “the 
First Amendment dictates that the right to comment on, parody, lampoon, and make other 
expressive uses of the celebrity image must be given broad scope.” In the case, however, 
the California Supreme Court concluded that “depictions of celebrities amounting to little 
more than the appropriation of the celebrity’s economic value are not protected 
expression under the First Amendment.”334 The court adopted copyright fair use’s 
“purpose and character of the use” factor,335 asking “whether a product containing a 
celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own 
expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.336 The test does not judge the quality of 
the expression, but instead focuses on “whether the literal and imitative or the creative 
elements predominate in the work.”337 Important to the court’s analysis is an analysis of 
whether the “marketability and economic value of the challenged work derive primarily 
from the fame of the celebrity depicted.”338 Thus, as a whole, a defendant in a right of 
publicity case may argue as a defense that his work “is protected by the First Amendment 
inasmuch as it contains significant transformative elements or that the value of the work 
does not derive primarily from the celebrity’s fame.”339 
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The defendant’s T-shirts of the Three Stooges, the court decided, were not 
sufficiently transformative of the performers’ likenesses to warrant the First Amendment 
defense.
340
 The “artist’s skill and talent [was] manifestly subordinated to the overall goal 
of creating a conventional portrait of a celebrity so as to commercially exploit his or her 
fame.”341 The T-shirts were marketable not because of Saderup’s skills, the court said, 
but because of the fame of the Three Stooges—consumers would buy the shirts not 
because they appreciated Saderup’s skill as an artist but because they were fans of the 
Three Stooges.
342
 The court could “perceive no transformative elements in Saderup’s 
works that would require” First Amendment protection.343 
The transformative use test proves to be especially protection of a plaintiff’s right 
of publicity, and in the minds of some scholars, is not protective enough of the First 
Amendment rights at issue.
344
 Professor Matthew Bunker notes that “transformative 
use places the burden of proof on the user, which is not consistent with standard First 
Amendment practice with regard to protected speech . . . The transformative use doctrine, 
on the other hand, places the burden squarely on the speaker to justify his or her 
speech.”345 He argues that the test does not adequately balance First Amendment values 
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because copyrighted works deserve more deference than uses of one’s name or 
likeness.
346
 Professor Eugene Volokh, too, notes that copyright law has a constitutional 
mandate and the right of publicity does not, which he argues means the First Amendment 
should loom more largely in right of publicity cases than in the traditional copyright fair 
use analysis
347
 Volokh asks, “Even if state law says that the right of publicity is a sort of 
property, why should First Amendment law tolerate a state law that uses the term 
‘property’ to bar people from expressing themselves in certain ways?”348 Thus, the 
transformative use test is protective of an individual’s right to publicity. 
ii. Rogers test 
 The test from Rogers v. Grimaldi
349
 came about after a film about dancers was 
titled “Ginger and Fred,” but was not about the eponymous, famous dancers Ginger 
Rogers and Fred Astaire. Instead, the fictional film by Federico Fellini told the story of 
two Italian cabaret performers who imitated Rogers and Astaire.
350
 The Third Circuit 
concluded that the right of publicity would not “bar the use of a celebrity’s name in a 
movie title unless the title was ‘wholly unrelated’ to the movie or was ‘simply a disguised 
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.’”351 The film was related to 
Rogers and Astaire in that it was about the dancing careers of two performers. Further, it 
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was not an advertisement, so the First Amendment trumped Ginger Rogers’ rights of 
publicity in that case. The Rogers test also has roots in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition, which states that “if the name or likeness is used solely to attract attention 
to a work that is not related to the identified person, the user may be subject to liability 
for a use of the other’s identity in advertising.”352  
 Courts apply the Rogers test less frequently than the transformative use test.
353
 
The Rogers test tends to be more protective of First Amendment interests than the 
transformative use test because it only applies to uses of information in expressive works, 
not in commercials.
354
 The Rogers test requires some suggestion of falsity due to its 
similarity to false endorsement claims, but the right of publicity does not require 
falsity.
355
 For this reason, some courts have held it inapplicable to right of publicity 
claims.
356
 
iii. Predominant use test 
 The Missouri Supreme Court articulated the predominant use test in Doe v. TCI 
Cablevision.
357
 In the case, a hockey player named Tony Twist sued the creators of a 
comic book after they developed a villain named Anthony “Tony Twist” Twistelli.358 The 
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court rejected the transformative use and Rogers tests as “preclud[ing] a cause of action 
whenever the use of the name and identity is in any way expressive, regardless of its 
commercial exploitation.”359 The court was concerned that these tests deferred too much 
to any expression. Thus, it expressed its new balancing test:  
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the commercial value of an 
individual's identity, that product should be held to violate the right of publicity 
and not be protected by the First Amendment, even if there is some ‘expressive’ 
content in it that might qualify as ‘speech’ in other circumstances. If, on the other 
hand, the predominant purpose of the product is to make an expressive comment 
on or about a celebrity, the expressive values could be given greater weight.
360
 
 
The court in TCI held, under this test, that the use by the comic book creators was 
a “literary device,” but concluded that the comic’s use of Twist’s persona “ha[d] very 
little literary value compared to its commercial value” and found a violation of Twist’s 
right of publicity.
361
 Other courts, however, have rejected the predominant use test as 
“subjective at best, arbitrary at worst, and in either case calls upon judges to act as both 
impartial jurists and discerning art critics.”362 The test allows courts to “select elements of 
a work to determine how much they contribute to the entire work’s expressiveness.”363 
Weighing in on the expressive value of speech is a role the Supreme Court has 
discouraged courts to take. For example, in both Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Association
364
 and United States v. Stevens,
365
 the Court refused to weigh the First 
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Amendment value of expressive speech, even in potentially morally objectionable 
situations—violent video games in Brown and ”snuff films” that depict women crushing 
animals with stiletto heels in Stevens. The Court would only find that certain specific 
categories of speech lack First Amendment protection—obscenity, fighting words, 
incitement.
366
 Thus, this test has generally fallen out of favor. 
B. The Newsworthiness Defense: A Shrinking Paradigm 
The “newsworthiness” defense is the primary way the press has, more generally 
than the right of publicity tests, exercised its autonomy throughout the last century. It is 
also the way courts have resolved conflicts between speakers’ autonomy in determining 
what to publish and individuals’ desires to control information.367 “Partly out of First 
Amendment concerns and partly out of a sense of their own limited competence, judges 
have regularly declined to second-guess journalists' editorial decisions.”368 The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts does discuss what newsworthiness is—and the language is 
notably deferential to the press: 
Included within the scope of legitimate public concern are matters of the kind 
customarily regarded as “news.” To a considerable extent, in accordance with the 
mores of the community, the publishers and broadcasters have themselves defined 
the term, as a glance at any morning paper will confirm.
369
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The Restatement declines to define what, precisely, is newsworthy, and rather outlines 
what is beyond the bounds of news value: that which “becomes a morbid and sensational 
prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, 
with decent standards, would say that he had no concern” is beyond the scope of the 
newsworthiness defense under the Restatement approach.
370
 
Recognizing the early tort of misappropriation, the Pavesich court identified this 
conflict between publication and private individuals’ interests as a major reason for the 
hesitation by some courts to adopt rights of privacy:  
The stumbling block which many have encountered in the way of a recognition of 
the existence of a right of privacy has been that the recognition of such right 
would inevitably tend to curtail the liberty of speech and of the press. The right to 
speak and the right of privacy have been coexistent. Each is a natural right, each 
exists, and each must be recognized and enforced with due respect for the 
other…One may be used as a check upon the other, but neither can be lawfully 
used for the other's destruction.
371
 
 
 Time v. Hill marked the first time the Supreme Court directly confronted the 
tension between individuals seeking to control information about themselves and 
publication by the press, in the context of New York’s privacy statute.372 The Hill family 
had been held captive by escaped convicts in their home, inspiring a fictional novel and 
then a play, which Life magazine covered.
373
 The novel and play took creative license 
with the Hill family’s story, adding several more dramatic elements.374 The family sued 
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under the privacy statute, arguing that Life’s article intended to, and did, give the 
impression that the novel and play were accurate depictions.
375
 Life asserted the defense 
that the story about the play and the Hill family’s brush with crime had news value.376 
The Court agreed, stating that “guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of 
political expression or comment upon public affairs . . . One need only pick up any 
newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of published matter which exposes 
persons to public view, both private citizens and public officials.”377 The Court concluded 
that the story addressed a matter of public concern, and thus the story’s news value 
served a defense to the Hill family’s claim.378 
 For years after these pronouncements, courts were deferential when journalists 
decided information was worth publishing. Coverage of crime, in particular, warranted 
deference, as Gajda illustrates with several examples of early cases allowing for press 
coverage of crime even when the perpetrators objected.
379
 For example, the Circuit Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that a bartender who worked in a hotel 
patronized by government officials did not have a claim for invasion of his privacy after a 
newspaper reported on his trial for sedition.
380
 Indeed, crime coverage was of particular 
news value according to courts in the mid-twentieth century, and courts chose to defer to 
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the press’ decision to publish.381 Indeed, the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of a New York statute that criminalized some crime-focused 
publications, including magazines comprising stories based on police reports and other 
accounts of criminal deeds.
382
 “‘Though we can see nothing of any possible value to 
society in these magazines,’ the Court wrote, ‘they are as much entitled to the protection 
of free speech as the best of literature.’”383 During this era, some courts even went so far 
as to say that the press was free to publish not just what journalists thought the public 
needed to know, but also what the public wanted to know—opening the door to more 
sensational stories being deemed newsworthy.
384
 
The dissenting opinion in Zacchini considered what might happen when the press’ 
interests come into conflict with an individual’s interest in controlling information about 
himself that has commercial value.
385
 Judge Powell wrote that in the case, the news 
broadcast “simply reported on what petitioner concede[d] to be a newsworthy event” by 
means of its nightly news coverage.
386
 He expressed concern that the holding of Zacchini 
would have “disturbing implications” by “lead[ing] to degree of media self-censorship” 
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in reporting on “clearly newsworthy events.”387 In the context of a right of publicity 
claim, Justice Powell opined that Zacchini’s public performance was newsworthy and 
thus he could not, “consistent with the First Amendment, complain of routine news 
reportage.”388 However, the dissent did not offer an opinion as to what constitutes a 
newsworthy event beyond the performance’s public nature because both parties agreed 
the “human cannonball” act had news value.389 
Gajda argues that courts in recent years have shifted from complete deference to 
journalists to more significant inquiries into what constitutes newsworthy information.
390
 
She rests this argument on increased societal concern about diminished privacy and a 
downturn in the public’s respect for journalism.391 She cites a number of recent federal 
district court cases chastising publication by media outlets for this proposition, and also 
points to the Supreme Court’s narrow holding in Bartnicki v. Vopper.392 In the case, the 
Court declined to broadly hold that the press could never be held liable for publication of 
truthful information, and instead narrowly held that on the facts of that case, the 
information about a union official making threats was of such obvious news value as to 
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warrant the newsworthiness defense.
393
 Gajda concludes that “[t]he Court’s evident 
comfort in balancing the privacy interests of particular claimants against what it judged to 
be the public value of a disputed news story may well encourage lower courts to go even 
further in this regard.”394 
If, indeed, courts are becoming increasingly stringent in their determinations of 
whether a publication is newsworthy, then they must have some standards by which to 
judge whether information possesses news value. The next sections outline factors that 
courts consider in striking a balance between an individual’s interest in maintaining 
autonomy by controlling information about herself and speakers’ interests in autonomous 
publishing decisions.  
i. Deference for Information in the Public Domain 
 When truthful information has entered the public domain, the Court has narrowly 
held in several cases that content creators could not be punished for publishing this 
information. The Court balanced the individual and First Amendment interests at stake in 
both cases. Such a determination suggests that, once information is public, courts should 
proceed cautiously and perhaps conclude that the press is free to deem this public 
information newsworthy. 
 The Court first addressed this issue in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
395
 in 
which a newspaper published the name of a deceased rape victim, violating a Georgia 
statute prohibiting publication of this information, and her father sued for invasion of his 
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privacy. The Court held that imposing sanctions on this information, obtained from 
public judicial records and a public trial, infringed the publisher’s First Amendment 
rights.
396
 This holding was narrow, however—the Court said it would not “address the 
broader question whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal 
liability” and would instead “focus on the narrower interface between press and privacy” 
involved in the facts of the specific case.
397
 The Court emphasized the public nature of 
the proceedings and citizens’ reliance on the press to track the activity of government.398 
It concluded that when the information involved was already in the public record, an 
individual has a diminished interest in controlling that information, and “the interests in 
privacy fade.”399 Concerned about the possible resulting chilling effect that sanctions for 
publication of information contained in public records could create, the Court concluded: 
By placing the information in the public domain on official court records, the 
State must be presumed to have concluded that the public interest was thereby 
being served. Public records by their very nature are of interest to those concerned 
with the administration of government, and a public benefit is performed by the 
reporting of the true contents of the records by the media. The freedom of the 
press to publish that information appears to us to be of critical importance to our 
type of government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct 
of public business. In preserving that form of government the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments command nothing less than that the States may not impose 
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sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official court 
records open to public inspection.
400
 
 
Similarly, Florida Star v. B.J.F. involved the publication of a rape victim’s name 
which a newspaper had gathered from a public report.
401
 The police report had been made 
public in error, and the newspaper in fact published the name accidentally, as it had an 
internal policy of declining to publish the names of rape victims.
402
 The Court again 
declined to decide whether truthful publication can be punished in keeping with the First 
Amendment.
403
 Again, the Court held that on this set of facts, the newspaper could not be 
punished because it lawfully obtained this truthful information from public records; in 
this case, the government could have kept the police report private, but it failed to do so 
and the newspaper could not be subject to liability for this error.
404
 
 These cases suggest that government is free to make certain records private. 
However, where they have been made public, a content creator cannot be held liable for 
their truthful publication. This suggests public records themselves are within an 
autonomous press’ right to deem newsworthy by virtue of their nature as public records. 
ii. Newsworthiness Based on the Subject’s Stature in Society 
` One consideration in the analysis of whether a piece of information about an 
individual is newsworthy is that individual’s stature in the community. In Supreme Court 
parlance, whether that individual is a “public figure” has bearing on the newsworthiness 
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of information about him or her. In a line of important cases, the Court concluded that the 
more public an individual’s persona, the more likely information about him or her is 
newsworthy.
405
  
In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court drew a line between public officials and 
private citizens, giving speakers breathing space to publish information about the former 
to avoid chilling speech on matters of public concern.
406
 The Court held that a higher 
standard of proof, actual malice, applied to public officials who sued for defamation.
407
 
This holding provided greater protection for speech on newsworthy matters. The Court 
extended this actual malice standard beyond public officials to public figures several 
years later.
408
 The plaintiffs in Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts were not elected officials, so the 
Court decided that the Sullivan standard was inapplicable; nonetheless, the Court 
concluded that there was public interest in the information involved.
409
 Butts was the 
athletic director for the University of Georgia and was well-known in the college football 
community.
410
 The publication alleged he was involved in “fixing” a football game.411 
The Court chose to “investigate[] the plaintiff’s position to determine whether he ha[d] a 
legitimate call upon the court for protection in light of his prior activities and means of 
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self-defense.”412 The Court held that the actual malice standard also applied to a person 
who was a public figure.
413
 A public figure under this standard is  not a public official but 
is “nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by 
reason of [his] fame, shape[s] events in areas of concern to society at large.”414 The 
importance of an individual’s standing in society in determinations about his ability to 
control information about himself came full circle in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
415
 The 
case arose when a magazine article incorrectly described Gertz, a lawyer who was 
representing a family in civil litigation after a police officer killed their child, as a 
“Leninist” and a “Communist-fronter.”416 Gertz sued for defamation, and the Court 
analyzed Gertz’s standing in the community to determine what burden of proof he 
carried.
417
 A person may become a public figure if he has “achieve[d] such pervasive 
fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts” or 
if he “injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby 
becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.”418 With these standards in mind, 
the Court concluded Gertz was not a public figure because Gertz “did not thrust himself 
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into the vortex of this public issue.”419 The Court left it to states to determine the burden 
of proof for private plaintiffs, so long as some level of fault was shown.
420
 
Although overruled by Gertz, a plurality of the Court in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc. focused on the nature of information published and society’s interest in 
it.
421
 Justice Brennan wrote that “[i]f a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it 
cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or 
because in some sense the individual did not ‘voluntarily’ choose to become involved.”422 
On these grounds, private citizens involved in matters of general interest must also satisfy 
the actual malice standard.
423
 
These standards suggest that an individual who exists in the public eye, or who is 
involved in some matter of public interest, has less control of information about himself. 
The Court seems to have decided that, in exchange for this position, he must sacrifice 
some of this autonomy. Social stature is not the only factor significant in decisions about 
what is worth sharing publicly. 
iii. Newsworthiness Based on Context  
 
Courts willing to take a deeper look at a piece of information’s newsworthiness 
have also considered the context in which the information appears. Indeed, especially in a 
tort claim based on unauthorized use of an individual’s identity, the context is crucial in 
                                                 
419
 418 U.S. at 352. 
 
420
 418 U.S. at 347.  
 
421
 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
 
422
 403 U.S. at 43. 
 
423
 403 U.S. at 43. 
 
   83 
light of the element requiring commercial use by the defendant. A simple search for cases 
containing the words “newsworthiness” and “right of publicity” yields a number of 
federal appellate court decisions that detail the context in which the use of information is 
judged for its news value. 
The Eleventh Circuit recently evaluated the context in which a piece of 
information appeared to decide whether the use warranted the newsworthiness defense in 
Toffoloni v. LFP Publishing Co.
424
 Professor Clay Calvert argued the case “represents a 
prime and dangerous example of Gajda’s hypothesis about the increased willingness of 
courts to intrude on the realm of journalists in privacy cases.”425 Nancy Benoit was a 
well-known model and professional wrestler who was famously murdered by her 
husband, also a wrestler, in 2007.
426
 After her death, a photographer in possession of 20-
year-old nude photographs of Nancy Benoit sold them to Hustler magazine.
427
 Hustler 
published the photographs 9 months later.
428
 Benoit’s mother sued under Georgia’s right 
of publicity statute to enjoin the publication a month before the photos appeared, but the 
district court held that Nancy Benoit’s death was a “legitimate matter of public interest 
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and concern” and so Hustler was not publishing them merely for its commercial gain, 
although one of its goal as a for-profit publication was, of course, to make a profit.
429
   
The court outlined the historical development of the right of publicity, noting its 
roots in privacy law and its increasingly pervasive recognition of economic harms.
430
 
Next, turning to the newsworthiness exception to a right of publicity claim, the court 
proclaimed that “[t]he right to privacy and corresponding right of publicity are 
necessarily in tension with the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech and of 
the press.”431 A right of publicity results in liability, the court said, when a publisher 
publishes “one’s image for pure financial gain, as in an advertisement . . . .”432  
Finally, the court turned to Hustler’s use of the nude photographs. Far from being 
deferential to Hustler’s decision to publish the images, the court engaged in what it called 
an “intensive review of both the relationship between the published photographs and the 
corresponding article, as well as the relationship between the published photographs and 
the incident of public concern—Benoit’s murder.”433 The court quickly concluded that 
the nude pictures standing alone without a news article would not be newsworthy.
434
 
Hustler’s publication included a biographical article about Benoit’s career, which the 
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court said was newsworthy on its own.
435
 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the 
photographs did not adequately illustrate the news story.
436
 “These photographs were not 
incidental to the article. Rather, the article was incidental to the photographs.”437 The 
court then engaged in a detailed analysis of the article and photo spread, noting that the 
magazine’s cover and table of contents referred only to the nude pictures and not the 
biographical piece accompanying them.
438
 A discussion of the contents of the article 
followed,
439
 with the court concluding that “[t]he heart of this article was the publication 
of nude photographs—not the corresponding biography.”440 Further, the court determined 
that the nude photographs “were in no way related to the ‘incident of public concern’ or 
‘current drama’” surrounding Benoit’s death.441 Hustler’s use was not newsworthy and so 
the publisher was liable to Benoit’s estate for damages.442 
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The Ninth Circuit, however, took a starkly different approach than the Toffoloni 
court in its consideration of a right of publicity claim based on a fashion spread, including 
photos and accompanying text, in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
443
 The Ninth 
Circuit drew from defamation law in creating a test to balance First Amendment interests 
against the right of publicity. In the case, L.A. Magazine created a fashion spread that 
altered a picture of actor Dustin Hoffman from his performance in the film “Tootsie” to 
put a designer’s clothing on the character.444 Hoffman argued the piece was commercial 
speech and so warranted lesser First Amendment protection. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, 
concluding that the article was not a “traditional advertisement” after analyzing the entire 
context in which the piece appeared: 
 [The magazine] did not receive any consideration from the designers for 
featuring their clothing in the fashion article containing the altered movie stills. 
Nor did the article simply advance a commercial message. [The article] appears as 
a feature article on the cover of the magazine and in the table of contents. It is a 
complement to and a part of the issue’s focus on Hollywood past and present. 
Viewed in context, the article as a whole is a combination of fashion photography, 
humor, and visual and verbal editorial comment on classic films and famous 
actors. Any commercial aspects are ‘inextricably entwined’ with expressive 
elements, and so they cannot be separated out ‘from the fully protected whole.’445 
 The court next concluded that because Hoffman was a public figure, to assert his 
right of publicity claim he must overcome the magazine’s First Amendment rights with a 
showing that the magazine acted with actual malice—knowledge that the photograph was 
false, or with reckless disregard for its falsity.
446
 “Oddly, the court never explained why 
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Hoffman would have to show falsity (or reckless disregard) with respect to a cause of 
action for which falsity is not an element. Perhaps, though, the case can be read as 
standing for the proposition that in other cases involving noncommercial speech, some 
degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny necessarily applies.”447 
The district court had concluded that the magazine acted with actual malice 
because it gave the false impression that Hoffman had worn the outfit he was pictured in. 
The standard the Ninth Circuit applied was that “[t]o show actual malice, Hoffman must 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that [the magazine] intended to create the 
false impression in the minds of its readers that when they saw the altered ‘Tootsie’ 
photograph they were seeing Hoffman's body.”448 The court refused to examine just the 
altered photograph and said it had to examine the “‘totality of [LAM's] presentation,’ to 
determine whether it ‘would inform the average reader (or the average browser)’ that the 
altered ‘Tootsie’ photograph was not a photograph of Hoffman's body.’”449 The entire 
magazine made clear, the court concluded, that the piece was not intended to suggest 
Hoffman actually wore the clothing in which he was portrayed. “All but one of the 
references to the article in the magazine make it clear that digital techniques were used to 
substitute current fashions for the clothes worn in the original stills.”450 In the magazine’s 
entire context, the court decided that because the magazine did not, with knowledge that 
the photograph was false or with reckless disregard for its falsity, mislead readers into 
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believing that Hoffman actually wore the outfit in which he was depicted, Hoffman could 
not sustain a claim for a violation of his right of publicity.
451
 This approach, which 
Calvert described as “holistic,”452 resulted in a conclusion that the spread warranted the 
newsworthiness exemption because “[v]iewed in context, the article as a whole [wa]s a 
combination of fashion photography, humor, and visual and verbal editorial comment on 
classic films and famous actors. Any commercial aspects are ‘inextricably entwined’ with 
expressive elements, and so they cannot be separated out ‘from the fully protected 
whole.’”453 
Finally, context can be critical in ensuring protection for creative expression that 
requires the use of information about individuals. A parody mocking baseball players was 
at issue in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Association.
454
 Cardtoons 
sold parody trading cards that used components of baseball players’ identities to poke fun 
at them.
455
  “Egotisticky Henderson” of the “Pathetics” was the fake player featured on a 
card parodying Oakland A’s player Ricky Henderson, known for his ego:  
The card features a caricature of Henderson raising his finger in a “number one” 
sign while patting himself on the back, with the following text: Egotisticky 
Henderson, accepting the “Me–Me Award” from himself at the annual 
“Egotisticky Henderson Fan Club” banquet, sponsored by Egotisticky Henderson: 
“I would just like to thank myself for all I have done. (Pause for cheers.) I am the 
greatest of all time. (Raise arms triumphantly.) I love myself. (Pause for more 
cheers.)  
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The court wrote that the cards required the “use of player identities because, in 
addition to parodying the institution of baseball, the cards also lampoon individual 
players.”456 In the context of a right of publicity claim, the court considered the players’ 
identifying information the “raw materials” necessary to complete the parodies 
successfully.
457
 The court thus concluded that the First Amendment provided a defense 
for usurping some of the players’ control of their identities.458 
 iv. Less Deference for Commercial Speech  
The Supreme Court has held that commercial speech holds a unique position in 
First Amendment jurisprudence. The U.S. Supreme Court defines it as “speech which 
does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction.’”459 Courts consider several 
factors, including whether the speech is conceded to be advertising, whether it refers to a 
specific product, and whether the speaker has an economic motivation for making the 
speech.
460
 Commercial speech does receive limited constitutional protection, as the 
Supreme Court has announced that the “relationship of speech to the marketplace of 
products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.”461 
However, it receives less First and Fourteenth Amendment protection than does other 
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constitutionally protected “pure” speech.462 Because commercial speech receives less 
constitutional protection, the government may be justified in regulating it, if the 
government can show the speech falls within the framework provided by Central Hudson 
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Commn. of New York.
463
 Under Central Hudson, the 
court must first determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment by 
being lawful and not misleading and then whether the government’s interest in regulating 
it is substantial; if the answer to these inquiries is yes, the court must next decide whether 
the regulation directly advances the government interest and whether it is more extensive 
than is necessary to serve that interest.
464
 
Thus, if the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity occurs in the context of 
commercial speech, the use warrants less First Amendment deference. Further, the 
commercial speech context is often more likely to be “for the purposes of trade,” making 
it easier to prove one of the elements of the tort. Context was similarly crucial to the 
Ninth Circuit when it weighed Kareem Abdul-Jabbar’s claim to his right of publicity 
against General Motors’ use of Abdul-Jabbar’s former name and basketball record in a 
commercial.
465
 General Motors asserted that Abdul-Jabbar’s basketball record was 
newsworthy and thus it was immune from liability for a violation of his right of publicity 
under California’s right of privacy statute. The Ninth Circuit held that while the record 
itself may have been newsworthy, General Motors’ use was commercial—it occurred “in 
                                                 
462
 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983). 
 
463
 Cent Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Commn. of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 
464
 Id. 
 
465
 Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 415–16 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 
   91 
the context of an automobile advertisement, not in a news or sports account.”466 Thus, the 
use of information Abdul-Jabbar wanted to control about himself was not newsworthy in 
the context of an advertisement. 
The right of publicity tests apply in situations when the newsworthiness defense is 
not readily apparent or applicable. The numerous factors that can contribute to a 
publication’s newsworthiness demonstrate the complexity of this determination. The new 
uses of mug shots highlight the increasing difficulty of drawing lines between when these 
differences infringe on individuals’ rights or when they are protected by the First 
Amendment. The next section discusses the challenges surrounding the application of 
current conceptions of the right of publicity in the context of mug shot websites. As 
technology progresses and uses for individuals’ information have increasing economic 
and social value, deciding when a use is protected and when it is not becomes harder. 
When new uses of information, like mug shot websites, arguably infringe individuals’ 
rights to control information while at the same time may embody First Amendment 
values, how should courts resolve this tension? 
V. RECONCEIVING IDENTITY TORTS: REFLECTING HISTORY AND MODERN 
DEVELOPMENTS WITH A UNIFIED APPROACH TO IDENTITY CLAIMS 
 
The recent use, or alleged misuse, of mug shots by websites seeking to profit from 
the use of this information about others provides a valuable lens through which to 
consider tensions between claims for rights to one’s identity and the First Amendment. 
While legislative, public, and corporate reactions may have hindered the original business 
model that essentially extorted money from individuals, the reaction may also infringe on 
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First Amendment rights. As technology has developed to allow for the collection of these 
mug shots by scraping other websites, questions have arisen about the use of these 
images in this manner—and who should be allowed to use them. Responses to these 
websites—both lawsuits claiming a right of publicity in the images and legislation aiming 
to control the use of mug shots—demonstrate a fundamental flaw with the current 
American approach to how the balance of who controls information is struck. Rather than 
relying on piecemeal legislation that does not take into account technological changes, 
jurisdictional issues, or harms both to individuals and content creators, this thesis 
proposes that a unified approach is necessary to explain how to balance First Amendment 
interests in information against individual interests in controlling that information. 
Defining the right of publicity not as a privacy- or property-based tort, but rather one that 
allows for autonomous control over information related to one’s identity provides more 
stable ground for resolving conflicts between individuals and publishers. This autonomy-
focused approach means that courts considering right of publicity claims must consider 
the entire context in which information appears, resisting the temptation to fall back on 
arguments about cluttered media environments and information overload. Only from that 
position can a holistic, contextual approach to right of publicity claims yield results that 
are sensitive to the autonomy of both parties.  
A. Patchwork Approaches to Identity Claims Fail to Protect Either Party’s 
Autonomy Interests 
 
In states where mug shots are public records, perhaps the newsworthiness issue 
has been decided. Following the holdings in Cox Broadcasting Corp. and Florida Star, 
public-record mug shots truthfully depict that a person was arrested. In that sense, a 
   93 
publisher should not be punished for publishing these public records—to do so would 
contravene First Amendment rights. “If the First Amendment protects republication of 
information about crime victims obtained from publicly-accessible sources, it surely 
gives companies a right to print tabloids or create websites featuring mug shots and arrest 
information made available to the public by police or sheriff's departments.”467 
This does not resolve the matter, however. As tables 1 and 2 demonstrate, some 
legislation in reaction to mug shot websites has resulted in removing mug shots from the 
public domain or putting restrictions on their use. As a matter of policy, journalists object 
to these changes. The problem is that these records are being taken out of the public 
domain after years of availability. Steven Aftergood, a privacy and surveillance expert, 
predicts that this trend of shifting mug shots from being public to being private records is 
likely to continue, and he sees this as an overreaction to the problems associated with 
mug shot websites. “From an information policy point of view, [mug shot websites are] 
likely to have adverse consequences. People are more likely to say, ‘Who needs it, let’s 
seal all of these records.’ That would be an unfortunate consequence.”468 For example, 
Georgia is considering a bill that would make mug shots private records. 
Governments are, of course, free to decide how to classify their records—public 
or private. But this thesis has shown that some of these bills place restrictions on how this 
publicly accessible information can be used after it has already been made public. For 
example, Minnesota H.B. 1940 applies to all websites and publications, and requires sites 
to remove the mug shots of individuals who were not convicted of a crime in connection 
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with their arrest immediately upon learning of the end of the case.
469
 Further, even those 
who are convicted of their crimes would be able to request that the site or publication 
change what they have published to publish only the individual’s first name, last initial, 
and crime.
470
 This forced editing or “unpublishing” infringes on content creators’ 
autonomy by directly overruling editorial judgment as to the publication of truthful 
information. The mug shot tells the world that a person was arrested. It is not a report of a 
conviction; it is a record of arrest. Additionally, journalists have legitimate arguments 
about the newsworthiness of these records. This legislation is symptomatic of the 
problem with a patchwork approach to information about individuals. Without an 
underlying theory that properly balances these individual concerns against First 
Amendment rights, both interests may suffer. 
A better approach to issues about control of information like mug shots is a 
unified theory that works across platforms, technologies, and jurisdictions. A piecemeal 
approach to personal information runs into trouble when one considers the context of the 
Internet. Under the current approach, whether one’s mug shot becomes public depends on 
where that person engages in the act resulting in the mug shot. Max Birnbaum, the young 
man featured in The New York Times piece, was unlucky enough to get caught with 
ecstasy in a state where mug shots are public records, and from there it spread across the 
Internet.
471
 Had Birnbaum been enjoying Spring Break in a state where mug shots are not 
public records, his mug shot would not be the first result when one performs a Google 
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search for his name. This state-by-state approach makes little sense in an era where the 
Internet does not stop at the state line. Laws should not react to technology in a way that 
allows jurisdictions to individually craft their rules. If the legal system takes seriously 
both an individual’s right to control information about himself and a content creator’s 
right to make editorial decisions autonomously, those rights should not end at 
jurisdictional boundaries. Rights, not technology, must drive law. 
Until a unified approach emerges, both sides of this balancing act suffer. On one 
hand, this piecemeal approach does not protect individuals from harm as new technology 
undermines their control of information about themselves. Whereas individuals used to 
believe that their mug shots were in the possession of the police and might be used by 
media outlets if the crime was notorious or newsworthy enough, individuals who are 
arrested now see many more uses for their mug shots, and they may complain about 
harms stemming from the mug shot industry. Until a state responds to the harm, likely 
years after the original use of the information, individuals suffer harm. On the other hand, 
incremental responses continually result in overreaction and in the in the chipping away 
of content that publishers previously could access, as this thesis’ survey of current 
pending legislative responses to the mug shot industry in tables 1 and 2 demonstrates. 
Warren and Brandeis essentially predicted this problem 124 years ago. Much harm can 
potentially flow from new technology. Some theory must undergird the entire concept of 
control of one’s name and likeness to offer a single, coherent approach that is applicable 
even in the face of unpredictable new technology and uses of that technology. 
B. An Autonomy-Based Approach Adequately Recognizes the Interests of 
Individuals and Publishers 
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This thesis proposes that autonomy theory should animate claims for violations of 
one’s control of his or her identity, both in terms of the interest claimed by the plaintiff 
and in defenses that content creators can assert. The interest in controlling one’s identity 
can be viewed as comprising both privacy interests and economic interests, as discussed 
above. Autonomy, conceived as control over information about oneself, is a better 
approach to the overarching interests asserted by plaintiffs in both misappropriation and 
right of publicity claims than either privacy or property because it encompasses the root 
of plaintiffs’ concerns in both—individuals want to control the narrative surrounding 
their image because they desire autonomous self-definition, They want to be the ones 
who benefit from these uses.  
This is particularly true in an era of YouTube fame and instant, if fleeting, 
celebrity. Individuals who are perhaps not famous in the traditional sense and whose 
brand of fame is unlikely to invite privacy invasions the way Davey O’Brien’s did may 
nonetheless have a commercial interest in their image. The rise of user-generated content 
in advertising suggests that firms believe in the commercial value of information about 
everyday people. For example, Doritos’ “Crash the Super Bowl” campaign invited 
anyone to star in, create and submit commercials for Doritos chips.
472
 The campaign has 
been hailed as an advertising success because of its involvement of even those without 
what would be seen as traditionally commercially valuable personas.
473
 The predicament 
of “hot convict” Meagan Simmons illustrates the point perfectly. Simmons is by no 
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means a celebrity. But the publication of her mug shot has given her some, likely fleeting, 
unwanted media attention, sparked by online communities of other “everyday people.” 
There is clearly a commercial value to her image, however, as at least one company’s 
advertising department felt it would attract customers to its business. An approach that 
focuses on balancing Simmons’ autonomy interests against publishers’ autonomy 
interests, rather than drawing bright lines along privacy or property regimes, better 
accounts for how all individuals view their right to control uses of their name or likeness 
today. 
C. A Totality of the Circumstances Test Could Resolve Tensions Between 
Publishers and Individuals 
 
Mug shot websites’ new business model—using individuals’ personal 
information, accompanied by advertising—presents a question about how courts should 
weigh claims governed by this autonomy-based identity tort. This example of a new use 
for technology illustrates another way a content creator’s interest in autonomous 
publishing decisions can increasingly infringe on individuals’ interest in controlling 
information and thus asserting their own autonomy. Courts should look to the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding a publisher’s use to determine whether the use constitutes 
an infringement of an individual’s right to control commercial uses of his or her identity.  
The rise of mug shot websites demonstrates that new uses for technology may represent 
borderline uses—uses that may have news value, but also serve the commercial interests 
of the publisher. This thesis shows that, traditionally, courts and scholars recognize that 
traditional news media profit from their work but that work still has news value. 
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Toffoloni, however, suggests a shift in this thinking, as Hustler’s work was deemed to 
infringe the plaintiff’s right of publicity 
Looking at traditional factors for newsworthiness, it is increasingly difficult to 
identify who is a public figure with a commercially valuable image and who is a private 
figure with an interest in avoiding an invasion of privacy..  As discussed above, even 
everyday, “average Joe” plaintiffs may have commercial value in their image, and 
everyone has an interest in autonomy. Thus, the individual’s stature alone cannot answer 
the newsworthiness question. 
Going forward, this right of identity claim should account for First Amendment 
concerns by respecting context, explicitly drawing from the defamation tort and 
considering the holistic use of information. The test must focus on the totality of the 
circumstances to weigh the plaintiff’s autonomy interest in controlling information with 
the content creator’s interest in autonomously choosing what to publish. The Ninth 
Circuit’s approach to the right of publicity claim in Hoffman, rather than the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach in Toffoloni, should be the standard for evaluating whether a content 
creator used the information in a way that impermissibly infringes on the subject’s 
autonomy.  
In defamation law, courts apply a “totality of the circumstances” test that, rather 
than isolating a single image or object from its surrounding context, considers the 
language as it appears to the reader to discern whether defamatory meaning exists, 
considering “all parts of the communication which are ordinarily heard or read with it.”474 
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The Supreme Court recently affirmed the importance of context in evaluating speech, 
holding that the “identity of the relevant reader or listener varies according to the 
context.”475 In a claim for a right to identity, courts should examine this context to make 
the newsworthiness determination. In the right to identity context, this holistic view is 
essential; one aspect of an individual’s identity may be used and suggest that a finding for 
the plaintiff is warranted, but the entire context of the creator’s content may suggest that 
the identity is newsworthy in context. The existing tests, particularly the transformative 
use test and the predominant use test, focus too narrowly on the use of a single aspect of 
the plaintiff’s identity, rather than considering the entire context in which the use appears. 
Use of identity should not decide for a plaintiff if an aspect of his or her identity appears 
in a publication and if that publication has a commercial motive. Rather, courts must look 
to every aspect of the publication as a whole to determine newsworthiness. Singling out a 
photograph, a name, or other indicia of identity out of an entire work will not adequately 
accommodate the First Amendment interests at play. This totality of the circumstances 
test must replace the existing right of publicity tests. 
In the context of uses of mug shots, this test would have several implications. A 
number of content creators, as discussed in the first part, use mug shots in varying ways. 
Future cases will require courts to evaluate the entire context and consider value beyond 
simply exploitation of mug shots for their commercial value. In some cases, a clear 
commercial interest accompanies some other valuable public interest. For example, 
Meagan Simmons may have a viable claim against InstantCheckmate.com, but not 
against the meme creators who add other value to her mug shot. Similarly, going forward, 
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websites who formerly charged for removal of mug shots and now profit from advertising 
will have to provide a holistic context for the use of the mug shots that suggests that use 
is newsworthy.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Mug shot websites, once despicable in the minds of some, have adapted their 
business practices. In the meantime, this thesis shows that two responses, claims under 
the right of publicity and legislative responses that limit or place conditions on the use of 
mug shots, have proliferated. The legislative responses, however, demonstrate a 
fundamentally flawed view of how law should adapt to tensions between First 
Amendment autonomy and individual autonomy interests. Rather than a piecemeal 
response that allows harm to accrue to individuals and provides little predictability for 
content creators, one theory should undergird a tort that would vindicate rights for all 
individuals who might be impacted by new uses of technology going forward. An 
autonomy interest, rather than a property or privacy interest, best supports these claims in 
today’s media environment. To ensure that this claim to a right to identity does not 
subsume First Amendment rights, courts must holistically evaluate right of identity 
claims in the context in which the claimed information appears.  
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Appendix 
State Right of Publicity & Appropriation Law: Statutory & Common Law 
State Citation to Applicable Law Summary of Law 
Alabama 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
No recognition of right of 
publicity at common law. 
N/A. 
Alabama 
Appropriation 
Birmingham Broad. Co. v. 
Bell, 68 So. 2d 314, (Ala. 
1953). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Alaska 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
No recognition of right of 
publicity at common law. 
N/A. 
Alaska 
Appropriation 
Smith v. Suratt, 7 Ak. 416 (D. 
Alaska 1926). 
No express recognition, but allowed for a “hot 
news” defense. 
Arizona 
Right of publicity 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 12-761 
and 13-3726 
Recognizes a statutory right of publicity for active 
and former members of the US Armed Forces. 
Pooley v. Nat'l Hole-In-One 
Ass’n, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. 
Ariz. 2000). 
Federal court interpreting state law stated the right 
of publicity exists under state law. 
Arizona 
Appropriation 
Reed v. Real Detective Publ'g 
Co., 162 P.2d 133, 138 (Ariz. 
1945). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Arkansas 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
 Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Arkansas 
Appropriation 
Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat 
Co., 590 S.W.2d 840 (Ark. 
1979) 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
California 
Right of publicity 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) Recognizes a statutory right of publicity for living 
and deceased persons. 
Montana v. San Jose Mercury 
News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) 
Recognizes a common law right of publicity for 
living persons. 
California 
Appropriation 
Montana v. San Jose Mercury 
News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) 
Recognizes a common law appropriation claim 
based on injury to dignity and self-esteem. 
Colorado 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Donchez v. Coors Brewing 
Co., 392 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 
2004). 
Federal court interpreting state law stated the right 
of publicity exists under state law. 
Colorado 
Appropriation 
Dickerson & Assocs. v. 
Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995 (Colo. 
2001). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Connecticut 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Connecticut 
Appropriation 
Goodrich v. Waterbury 
Republican-Am., Inc., 448 
A.2d 1317 (Conn. 1982). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Delaware No statute. N/A. 
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Right of publicity Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Delaware 
Appropriation 
Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 
189 A.2d 773, 774 (Del. 1963) 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Florida 
Right of publicity 
FLA. STAT. § 540.08 Recognizes a statutory right of publicity not 
limited to privacy interests. 
 Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Florida 
Appropriation 
Fuentes v. Mega Media 
Holdings, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 
2d 1255 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Georgia 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. 
for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. 
Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 
S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982). 
Recognizes common law right of publicity as 
distinct from a right to privacy. 
Georgia 
Appropriation 
Pavesich v. New England Life 
Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, (Ga. 
1905). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Hawaii 
Right of publicity 
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 482P-1 
to 482P-8 
Recognizes the right of publicity as a property 
interest. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Hawaii 
Appropriation 
Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian 
Ocean View Estates, 441 P.2d 
141 (Haw. 1968). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Idaho 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Idaho 
Appropriation 
Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l 
Bank, 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 
1961) 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Illinois 
Right of publicity 
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/1-
1075/60. 
Recognizes statutory right of publicity that 
controls use of image for commercial purposes. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
Statute replaced common law as of 1/1/99. 
Illinois 
Appropriation 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
Statute replaced common law appropriation as of 
1/1/99. 
Indiana 
Right of publicity 
IND. CODE §§ 32-36-1-0.2 to 
32-36-1-20 
Recognizes statutory right of publicity as a 
property interest. 
Cont'l Optical Co. v. Reed, 86 
N.E.2d 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1949) 
Recognizes common law right of publicity as a 
privacy interest.. 
Indiana 
Appropriation 
Cont'l Optical Co. v. Reed, 86 
N.E.2d 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1949) 
No distinction between common law right of 
publicity and appropriation torts. 
Iowa 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Iowa 
Appropriation 
Howard v. Des Moines 
Register & Tribune Co., 283 
N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979) 
Recognizes the invasion of privacy by 
appropriation, but no court has heard a claim for 
appropriation of name or likeness. 
Kansas 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
No recognition of right of N/A. 
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publicity at common law. 
Kansas 
Appropriation 
Johnson v. Boeing Airplane 
Co., 262 P.2d  808 (1953). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Kentucky 
Right of publicity 
KY. REV. STAT. § 391.170 Recognizes a statutory right of publicity. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Kentucky 
Appropriation 
McCall v. Courier-Journal & 
Louisville Times Co., 623 
S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest.  
Louisiana 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Louisiana 
Appropriation 
Jaubert v. Crowley Post-
Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386 
(La. 1979) 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Maine 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Maine 
Appropriation 
Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 
365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Maryland 
Right of publicity 
MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 
19-503) 
Recognizes only a right of publicity that 
criminalizes the use of the name or likeness of a 
soldier killed in the line of duty for commercial 
advantage. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Maryland 
Appropriation 
Lawrence v. A.S. Abell Co., 
299 Md. 697 (1984). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Massachusetts 
Right of publicity 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214 § 
3A. 
Recognizes the right of publicity as a property 
interest. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Massachusetts 
Appropriation 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214 § 
1B 
Recognizes appropriation as a privacy interest. 
Michigan 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & 
Co., 322 Mich. 411, 416-17 
(1948). 
Recognizes a common law right of publicity. 
Michigan 
Appropriation 
Armstrong v. Eagle Rock 
Entm' t, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d 
779, 784 n. 2 (E.D. Mich. 
2009). 
Recognizes common law appropriation. Courts do 
not distinguish between the right of publicity and 
appropriation. 
Minnesota 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 
65 F.3d 725, 730 (8th Cir. 
1995) 
Federal court interpreting state law stated the right 
of publicity exists under state law. 
Minnesota 
Appropriation 
Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 
1998). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Mississippi 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Mississippi Deaton v. Delta Democrat Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
   112 
Appropriation Publ'g Co., 326 So. 2d 471 
(Miss. 1976). 
privacy interest. 
Missouri 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Bear Foot, Inc. v. Chandler, 
965 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1998). 
Recognizes a common law right of publicity as a 
property interest. 
Missouri 
Appropriation 
Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broad., 
709 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1986). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Montana 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
No recognition of right of 
publicity at common law. 
N/A. 
Montana 
Appropriation 
Gilham v. Burlington 
Northern, 514 F.2d 660 (9th 
Cir. 1975). 
Court suggested it might adopt appropriation tort 
but stopped short of doing so.  
Nebraska 
Right of publicity 
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201-
20-211 and 25-840.01. 
Privacy statutes include a right of publicity. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Nebraska 
Appropriation 
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201-
20-211 and 25-840.01. 
Recognizes a statutory right to privacy that 
includes the right of publicity and does not 
distinguish between the two.  
Nevada 
Right of publicity 
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 597.770 
to 597.810 
Recognizes a statutory right of publicity as a 
property interest. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Nevada 
Appropriation 
Kuhn v. Account Control 
Technology, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 
1443 (D. Nev. 1994). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
New Hampshire 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 
F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994). 
Recognizes the right of publicity as part of the 
appropriation tort. 
New Hampshire 
Appropriation 
Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 
F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994). 
Recognizes the appropriation tort and does not 
distinguish between this and the right of publicity. 
New Jersey 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 
912 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Recognizes the right of publicity as a property 
interest. 
New Jersey 
Appropriation 
Edison v. Edison Polyform 
Manufacturing Co., 67 A. 392 
(N.J. Ch. 1907). 
Recognizes appropriation as a common law right 
but uses it interchangeably with the right of 
publicity and roots it in property interests. 
New Mexico 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
No recognition of right of 
publicity at common law. 
N/A. 
New Mexico 
Appropriation 
Andrews v. Stallings, 892 
P.2d 611 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1995). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
New York 
Right of publicity 
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50 
and 51 
Recognizes the right of publicity. Courts have 
differed as to whether the statute protects property 
or privacy interests. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
New York 
Appropriation 
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50 
and 51 
Recognizes appropriation. Courts have differed as 
to whether the statute protects property or privacy 
interests. 
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North Carolina 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
North Carolina 
Appropriation 
Flake v. Greensboro News 
Co., 195 S.E. 55 (N.C. 1938) 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
North Dakota 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
North Dakota 
Appropriation 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Ohio 
Right of publicity  
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2741.02 
Recognizes a statutory right of publicity that is in 
addition to the common law right of publicity. 
Zacchini v. Scripps−Howard 
Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454 
(Ohio 1976). 
Recognizes a common law right of publicity. 
Ohio 
Appropriation 
Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 
340, 343 (Ohio 1956). 
Recognizes appropriation as common law right. 
Differs from statute in that remedies vary and 
common law rights terminate at death.  
Oklahoma 
Right of publicity 
OKLA. STAT.. TIT. 12, §§ 1448 
and 1449 
Recognizes rights of publicity for living and 
deceased persons as property rights. 
Oklahoma 
Appropriation 
OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21, § 839.1, 
McCormack v. Oklahoma 
Publ'g Co., 613 P.2d 737 
(Okla. 1980), 
Recognizes appropriation as a statutory and 
common law right to privacy. 
Oregon 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Oregon 
Appropriation 
No recognition of right of 
publicity at common law. 
N/A. 
Pennsylvania 
Right of publicity 
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
8316(a) 
Recognizes a statutory right of publicity that is in 
addition to the common law right of publicity. 
Philadelphia Orchestra Assoc. 
v. Walt Disney Co., 821 F. 
Supp. 341 (E.D. Pa. 1993) 
Recognizes a common law right of publicity as a 
property right. 
Pennsylvania 
Appropriation 
Lewis v. Marriott Intern., Inc., 
527 F. Supp. 2d 422 (E.D. Pa. 
2007). 
Recognizes appropriation as a common law right. 
Courts have discussed, but not ruled, whether the 
right of publicity statute subsumes appropriation at 
common law. 
Rhode Island 
Right of publicity 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28. Recognizes a statutory right of publicity, used 
interchangeably with appropriation. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Rhode Island 
Appropriation 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28. Recognizes statutory appropriation, used 
interchangeably with the right of publicity. 
South Carolina 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Gignillat v. Gignillat, Savitz 
and Bettis, LLP, 385 S.C. 452 
(2009). 
Recognizes a common law right of publicity as a 
property interest. 
South Carolina 
Appropriation 
Gignillat v. Gignillat, Savitz 
and Bettis, LLP, 385 S.C. 452 
(2009). 
Recognizes appropriation at common law as 
protecting the same interests as the right of 
publicity. 
South Dakota 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
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South Dakota 
Appropriation 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Tennessee  
Right of publicity 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-
1101 to 47-25-1108 
Recognizes a statutory right of publicity as a 
property right.  
State ex rel. Elvis Presley 
Intern. Meml. Found. v. 
Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89 
(Tenn. App. 1987). 
Recognizes a common law right of publicity that is 
coextensive with the statutory right. 
Tennessee 
Appropriation 
Langford v. Vanderbilt Univ., 
287 S.W.2d 32 (Tenn. 1956). 
Courts recognize the general right to privacy, but 
courts have not distinguished between the four 
privacy torts. 
Texas 
Right of publicity 
TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 26.001 to 
26.015 
Recognizes a right of publicity for deceased 
persons as a property right. 
Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 
46 F. Supp. 2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 
1999). 
Recognizes a right of publicity as the same as 
appropriation, based in a privacy interest. 
Texas 
Appropriation 
Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 
46 F. Supp. 2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 
1999). 
Recognizes appropriation as the same as the right 
of publicity, based in a privacy interest. 
Utah 
Right of publicity 
U.C.A. 1953 § 45-3-1. Recognizes a statutory right of publicity as a 
property right. 
 Nat.'s Way Products, Inc. v. 
Nat.-Pharma, Inc., 736 F. 
Supp. 245 (D. Utah 1990). 
Recognizes a common law right of publicity based 
on a property interest. 
Utah 
Appropriation 
Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 
(Utah 1988). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Vermont 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
No recognition of right of 
publicity at common law. 
N/A. 
Vermont 
Appropriation 
Staruski v. Continental 
Telephone Co. , 581 A.2d  266 
(Vt. 1990). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Virginia 
Right of publicity 
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 Recognizes a statutory right of publicity as a 
property right. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Virginia 
Appropriation 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Washington 
Right of publicity 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
63.60.010 to 63.60.080 
Recognizes a statutory right of publicity as a 
property interest. 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
Washington 
Appropriation 
Mark v. Seattle Times, 635 
P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1981). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
West Virginia 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
 Crump v. Beckley 
Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 
70, (W. Va. 1983). 
Recognizes a common law right of publicity as a 
property interest. 
West Virginia 
Appropriation 
Crump v. Beckley 
Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 
70, (W. Va. 1983). 
Recognizes common law appropriation as a 
privacy interest. 
Wisconsin 
Right of publicity 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50 Recognizes a statutory right of publicity. 
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 Hirsch v. S. C. Johnson & 
Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 
(Wis. 1979). 
Recognizes a common law right of publicity that 
courts do not distinguish from appropriation. 
Wisconsin 
Appropriation 
Hirsch v. S. C. Johnson & 
Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 
(Wis. 1979). 
Recognizes common law appropriation that courts 
do not distinguish from right of publicity. 
Wyoming 
Right of publicity 
No statute. N/A. 
No recognition of right of 
publicity at common law. 
N/A. 
Wyoming 
Appropriation 
Not recognized at common 
law. 
N/A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
